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SCHOOL CHOICE AND STATES' DUTY TO
SUPPORT "PUBLIC" SCHOOLS
AARON JAY SAIGER*

Abstract: The education clauses of state constitutions require states to
support schools that not only educate children adequately and equitably,
but that are "public" or "common." This Article argues that state-supported school choice can be consistent with these latter requirements. Individual choices, about where to live and whether to educate children privately, have long shaped traditional "public" schooling arrangements. The
more direct role choice plays in school voucher and charter programs is
also consistent with the requirement that schools be "public." Such programs must ensure, however, that parents' choices among schools are
"genuine and independent." This criterion, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of school vouchers under the
Federal Establishment Clause, also guarantees publicness. It does so by requiring that parents' options in the educational marketplace be determined by market demand, minimally biased by government preferences.
INTRODUCTION

Every state constitution contains an "education clause" that discusses public education.1 Even for those who recognize an implied,
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This Article has

greatly benefited from discussions with and thoughtful critique by colleagues including
Richard Garnett, Jennifer Gordon, Abner Greene, Thomas Lee, Christopher Lubienski,
Rachel Moran, William Reese, Laurie Reynolds, Daniel Richman, James Ryan, Amy Uelman, and Ben Zipursky. I am grateful to the National Academy of Education/Spencer
Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship Program and the Fordham Law School for financial
and intellectual support, to Deana Kim EI-Mallawany and Veronica Rodriguez for research
assistance, and to Laurence Abraham of the Fordham Law Library.
I See ALA. CONST. art. X1V, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XlV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 5-6; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; HAw. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX 2d, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt.
2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIIL § 1; MISS. CONST. art.
VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § I(A); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4(1); N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y.CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, §§ 2-3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIIL § 1; OR. CONST. art. VMII,
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federal constitutional right to schooling-a position without traction
in the courts but surprising resilience in the academy 2-these clauses
provide Americans' principal guarantee of educational rights. 3 A series of prominent school finance cases over the past several decades
has held, moreover, that the clauses impose a duty upon states to educate all children consistently with substantive standards of quality and
4
equity.
The education clauses also instruct states to create and maintain
school systems that are "public" or "common."5 Such terms limit the
methods states may use to realize the clauses' substantive mandates.
These limitations have become relevant as states, at an ever-accelerating pace, implement school choice programs as a way of addressing
the quality6 and equity7 demands the education clauses impose. This
Article analyzes whether vouchers8 and charter schools, 9 the two most
§ 3;

PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. X1I, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST.
§ 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1;
VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST.
art. XII § 1; WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Molly McUsic, The Use of
art. VIII,

Education Clauses in School FinanceReform Litigation, 28 HARV.J, ON LECIs. 307, 311 (1991).
2 Compare San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1973), with LAWRENCE G.
SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 96 (2004), and Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
NationalCitizenship, 116 YALE LJ. 330, 334 (2006).
a See Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REv. 708, 714 (1983) (Justice of the NewJersey Supreme Court describing his
court's decision favoring school-finance plaintiffs as "pick[ing] up the gauntlet" thrown
down by Rodriguez).
4 For some of the numerous good accounts of the finance cases, see generally Peter
Enrich, LeavingEquality Behind: New Directions in SchoolFinanceReform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101
(1995); Michael Heise, EqualEducational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School
FinanceEquity Theory, 32 GA. L. REv. 543 (1998) [hereinafter Heise, Equal EducationalOpportunity]; Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave".
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995) [hereinafter Heise, State Constitutions].
5 Many clauses also require that states support schools that are "free" and/or "uniform." See infra notes 171-191 and accompanying text.
6 See Christopher Pixley, The Next Frontierin Public School FinanceReform, 24J. LEGIS. 21,
24 (1998).
7 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
8 Notwithstanding tepid political support for voucher programs among powerful suburban constituencies, interest in vouchers appears again to be on the rise. See LANCE
FUSARELLI, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 6 (2003); Chad d'Entremont &

Luis A. Huerta, Irreconcilable Differences? Education Vouchers and the Suburban Response, 21
EDUC. POL'y 40, 42 (2007); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of School
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2079-82 (2002). States have recently adopted both new voucher

programs and new tax credit programs for organizations subsidizing private school tuitions. See Parent Choice in Education Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-la-801 to -811 (2007)
(authorizing voucher programs); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 44-62-1 to -7 (2006) (permitting cor-
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prominent forms of state-funded school choice,10 are consistent with
the requirements of publicness and commonness. 1
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that "school
choice" reforms like vouchers and charters do not actually introduce
choice into K-12 schooling. 12 Instead, they change the regulatory system
applied to an existing, baseline market for schools that already permits
substantial parental choice. This baseline market has two components.
First, parents choose whether to exit the public system in favor of private
schools. This variety of choice is a federal constitutional mandate-in
1923, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of compulsory schooling but held that parents retain a
right to educate their children privately, rather than in governmentsponsored schools.' 3 Second, parents choose among local public school
systems with their choice of residence. In 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley14 and

porate donations to fund school vouchers); Luis A. Huerta & Chad d'Entremont, Education
Tax Credits in a Post-Zelman Era, 21 EDUC. POL'Y 73, 80, 103 n.2 (2007) (surveying and
analyzing tax credit statutes); Danny Hakim, Spitzer Budget Seeks Overhaul of Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at Al (explaining how newly elected New York governor includes
means-tested "$1,000-per-child tax deduction for private school tuition" in his maiden
budget).
9 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing the charter school form).
The charter school continues its exponential spread nationwide. See JOSEPH MURPHY &
CATHERINE SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT

11, 32-34 (2002) (documenting exploding numbers of charter schools).
10 Because home schooling is not directly supported by substantial government funds,
this Article does not consider the large and burgeoning home-schooling movement. See
Bruce C. Cooper & John Sureau, The Politics of Homeschooling, 21 EDUC. POL'Y 110, 112
(2007). Some home-schooled students do, however, use services provided by traditional
public schools and charter schools. See id. at 120-22 (discussing traditional public schools);
Luis A. Huerta et al., Cyber and Home School CharterSchools, 81 PEABODYJ. EDUC. 103, 110
(2006) (discussing charter schools).
11 Some state constitutions prohibit the use of state funds to benefit religious institutions, including schools; these so-called "baby Blaine amendments," in those states where
they are present, pose a more direct obstacle to voucher programs that include religious
schools than the state education clauses. See Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Zelman's Future:
Vouchers, Sectarian Providen, and the Next Round of ConstitutionalBattles, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 917, 958-62 (2003); TobyJ. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA.
L. REV. 117, 123-24 (2000). Unlike the baby Blaines, however, state education clauses are
ubiquitous among the states. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra, at 959-61 (explaining that ten state
constitutions lack prohibitions on state aid to religious institutions, and language in many
others has been construed not to constrain voucher programs). Moreover, education
clauses have the potential to constrain not only traditional voucher programs, but also
charter schools and voucher programs that exclude religious institutions.
12See infra notes 25-89 and accompanying text.
13See 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
14418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:909

in 1973 in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,15 the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the
nearly universal state practice of delegating much of school management
and finance to small local school districts.
Because both private schools and residences are bought and sold
in markets, the Federal Constitution effectively guarantees markets for
schooling-albeit markets of unusual form. The relevant constitutional question about contemporary school choice programs is therefore not whether choice or educational markets are constitutionally
permissible. They are required. Rather, the question is whether the
institutional limitations of the education clauses permit states to supplant the standard regulatory approach to choice-permitting it only
to those who exercise it by purchasing private schooling or by choice
of residence-with charter and voucher programs that deploy marketlike mechanisms to expand access to choice beyond these groups.
Part H turns to the education clauses themselves.1 6 It first reviews
the institutional requirements of the clauses and several recent unsatisfactory cases interpreting them.1 7 Then, after describing how the
clauses' terms resist straightforward historical or textualist interpretation, it explicates the two major competing paradigms in the literature
regarding what makes a "public" or "common" school system public or
common. One is a statist understanding, which emphasizes that public schooling should be directly provided by the polity and open to all
its resident children. The second, pluralist approach contends that a
liberal and diverse society best serves the public good by permitting
individuals to choose educational options that best match their own
goals and preferences. Part II argues that both views offer a legitimate
perspective on what institutional values public or common schools
must further.18 Therefore, state courts should accept as constitutional
decisions by their political branches to support public schooling in
ways consistent with either statist or pluralist understandings.
Under a statist approach, traditional institutional arrangements
for public schooling are constitutional, notwithstanding localist and
other features of such arrangements that fall short of publicness and
commonness in some important respects. Part III argues that, under a
pluralist approach to publicness, state-supported voucher and charter

15411 U.S. 1 (1973).
16 See

infra notes 90-223 and accompanying text.

17 See generally Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006); Ohio ex rel. Ohio Cong. of

Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio 2006).
18 See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
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programs are also constitutional. 19 Such programs, however, must ensure that choice is "genuine and independent," i.e., that parents' decisions are determined insofar as possible by market forces operating
without being biased by government. The identification of "publicness" with the robustness of competition in a market contradicts the
view, dominant in school choice debates, that broad choice undermines "publicness." In fact, Part I argues, robustness of competition
20
and "publicness" move in parallel.
The "genuine and independent choice" criterion is taken, somewhat counterintuitively, from the 2002 case Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court held voucher programs that include
religious schools to be consistent with the Establishment Clause. 2 1 Although Zelman is a federal case about a federal constitutional right, it
provides two important guideposts for this Article's state-law investigation of the very different right to education. First, Zelman properly
conceptualizes a state's adoption of school choice as a shift in its regulatory posture towards the market for K-12 schooling. 22 Second, Zelman usefully identifies the necessity of preventing government from
23
biasing individual choices in a pluralist, market-oriented system.
Analogously, I argue, the expansion of access to markets can further
publicness, but only insofar as the government permits the market
freely to respond to parental preferences. Unnecessary limitations on
market mechanisms regarding price, entry, and exit skew choices in
particular, government-approved directions, and so prevent the newly
accessible market from being public, common, or free.
Part IH concludes with a brief analysis of an additional requirement that choice programs must meet: they must bear a reasonable
connection to the goal of improving educational quality. 24 By design,
this criterion is fairly easy to satisfy and is certainly satisfied notwithstanding the failure of charters and vouchers demonstrably to yield
many of their promised benefits. The relatively weak "reasonable connection" standard is appropriate in light of the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects of choice and because education is a positive, rather than a negative, right.

19See infra notes 224-350 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 229-316 and accompanying text.
21 See generally 536 U.S. 639 (2002); infra notes 229-316 and accompanying text.

22See infra notes 229-316 and accompanying text.
23 See infta notes 229-316 and accompanying text.
24 See infta notes 317-350 and accompanying text.
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BASELINE MARKET FOR SCHOOLING

The U.S. Constitution mandates that all parents have the right to
choose (and pay for) private schools for their children. 25 Some type of
market for schooling, therefore, is constitutionally required. 26 The
Constitution also guarantees the right to choose one's place of residence, which, in a system where housing is a market good and schools
are locally governed, creates a geographically-based market for schooling as well. Any limitations that state constitutions' education clauses
place upon choice must take these markets into account.
This Part briefly discusses these two markets, one driven by competition between public and private schools and the other by choice of
residence. 27 It then describes the two primary education reforms referred to as "school choice" -vouchers and charters-as shifts in states'
regulatory policies with respect to the first market.2 8 States could also
develop choice reforms that alter regulatory approaches to the second,
interjurisdictional, market. In practice, however, they have not done so.
A. Markets Across School Types
Schooling is compulsory in all fifty statesY9 In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this to be a genuine
restraint upon freedom and consumer sovereignty, but justified it nev30
ertheless in light of the strong state interest in an educated populace.
But Pierce also established that, notwithstanding compulsory education,
parents have the liberty to remove their children from state-sponsored
"public" schools and educate them instead in private institutions: 31
25 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
26

See id.

27 See infra notes 29-72.
28 See infra notes 73-89.
29 See LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM AIKMAN,
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 34

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

OF COMPULSORY

(1980).

30 See 268 U.S. at 534-35. This interest has been recognized across the ideological spectrum. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 86 (1962); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 42 (1987); LORRAINE PANGLE & THOMAS PANGLE, THE LEARNING OF
LIBERTY: THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 91-92, 107 (1993) (discussing John Locke, Samuel Harrison Smith, and Thomas Jefferson); MARK G. YUDOF,

52-55 (1983) (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 80 (1966); BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 368-69 (1939)).
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS

I1 268 U.S. at 536. See also YUDOF, supra note 30, at 228-30 (documenting "widespread
hostility to overruling Pierce," which "represents a reasonable, if imperfect accommodation

of conflicting pressures" notwithstanding its dubious doctrinal and theoretical foundation). For a concise summary of objections to Pierce, see Barbara Woodhouse, Speaking
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"The fundamental theory of liberty ... excludes any general power of

the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."32
By forbidding the prohibition of private schooling, Piercerequires
states to tolerate a market for private schooling. 33 But schooling is not
a typical consumer good; both demand and supply in the industry are
highly regulated by government.3 4 On the demand side, that schooling is compulsory means that parents cannot substitute goods that
they might prefer for education. On the supply side, education is subsidized, with government ensuring that every student can attend some
school without charge. Prices, entry, and exit from the market therefore cannot and do not work in standard ways.
The market for K-12 schooling is also characterized by profound
information failures. American education suffers from severe normative conflict over what goals are proper for education,3 5 especially
when vague platitudes must be made specific.3 6 Even for those goals
that command widespread consensus-engendering literacy, for example-there is confusion and division regarding how effectively to
teach children what we want them to know,3 7 and widespread dis-

agreement about how and even whether success or failure can be
identified and measured.3 8 In other words, education is beset by techTruth to Power, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481, 481-82 (2002). For a defense, see Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children,
76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109, 120-43 (2000).
32
Pierc, 268 U.S. at 535.
3 See id.
34 These features make the market for K-12 schooling sufficiently different from an
ordinary market that many prefer the term "quasi-market." E.g., James Forman, Jr., Do
CharterSchools Threaten PublicEducation?EmergingEvidencefrom Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market
for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 839, 839; Christopher Lubienski, School Choice and Privatization in Education, 4J. FOR CRITICAL EDUC. POL'Y STUD. 1, 4-5 (2006), available at http://
www.jceps.com/?pageID=article&articleID= 57.
35 See COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES FOR EDuc. RESEARCH, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN
EDUCATION 17 (Richard J. Shavelson & Lisa Towne eds., 2002); JOHN COONS & STEPHEN
SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE 1-2 (1978); GUTMANN, supra note 30, at 66-70 (discussing Coons and Sugarman and reaching normative conclusions that are themselves deeply
controversial); ROSEMARY SALAMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING 198-200 (2000) (stating that
Gutmann's claims "ignited and sustained a firestorm of reaction").
% See SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 197, 232-33.
37 See COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, supra note 35, at 46
(stating that "in fields like education ... findings tend to contradict one another across
studies"); Carl F. Kaestle, The Awful Reputation of Education Research, 22 EDUC. RESEARCHER
23, 29 (1993).
8 See Sean Cavanagh, NCTM Relaxes Stance on High-Stakes Testing, EDUC. Wt., Feb. 1,
2006, at 8; Michelle Davis, NCLB Panel Gathers Views on Testing and Data Collection, EDUC.
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nological as well as teleological uncertainty. 39 Uncertainty about what
to teach, how best to teach it, and how to evaluate performance has
helped generate both the crisis of adequacy in the nation's many "failing" school districts, where large numbers of students are not brought
even to basic levels of educational competency,40 and the broader cri41
sis of "mediocrity" that continues to beset many schools nationwide.
The diversity of goals and methods for teaching create the potential for substantial product differentiation across the different categories of values, curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. But confusion as
to values and uncertainty as to both pedagogy and assessment also
invite suppliers to make multiplying, conflicting, and often unverifiable claims about the quality of their products, force consumers to
make decisions without any straightforward and reliable ways to
evaluate those claims, and complicate regulation.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of regulation, government nevertheless closely regulates all providers of schooling. Pierce explicitly invites
states to do so to advance the state interest in education. 42 A state may
for example, regulate curriculum, textbooks, and teacher qualifications.43 The only caveat is that the regulation may not be so close as to
leave private schools effectively without genuine educational freedom
of action; a state may not make a formalism of Pierce rights and convert
its own schools into a de facto monopoly.4 This leaves very substantial
latitude for government regulation of private schools. States exercise
this latitude pervasively,45 although they have been reluctant, sensibly
or not, to regulate what might be called schools' point of view even up to

WK., May 17, 2006, at 25; Bess Keller, States' Standards, Tests Are a Mismatch, Study Finds,
EDUC. WK., July 26, 2006, at 5.
39 See, e.g., DAVID R. OLSON, PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5-6
(2003) (stating that "educational thought and research lack an organizing theory" or "organizing framework").
40 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE LJ. 249, 274-75 (1999)
(documenting pathologies of distressed schools).
41 NAT'L COMM. ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983).
42 Piere, 268 U.S. at 534.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 535.
45 See Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools, 2003 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 363,
397-98 (2003) (discussing regulatory schemes). But see JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS
WITHIN REASON 175 (2002) (-IThe reality is that there is virtually no regulation in this
country of the content of instruction or treatment of students in private schools.").
Dwyer's critique focuses on religious schools. See id.
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the constitutional limitations imposed by Pierce,46 free speech guarantees, and, in the case of regulation of religious schools, 47 the right of
free exercise. 48 But notwithstanding the latitude that private schools
enjoy with respect to religion in particular, and point of view in general,
pervasive regulation dramatically restricts the range of choices available
in the market for private schooling. Schools cannot, for example, offer
only three hours of schooling a day, or decline to teach mathematics, or
fail to maintain attendance records, even if such schools, were they
permitted to satisfy the compulsory schooling requirement, might find
customers, and even though there are pedagogical and other justifications for such unusual programs. 49
The state influences private schools not only by regulating them
directly but also by sponsoring its own public schools. Even as the state
regulates its competition, it is also itself the market leader, controlling,
depending on how one counts, approximately ninety percent of the
market.50 Direct regulation limits what private schools may do; competition with public schools for students limits what private schools choose
to do. One aspect of that competition is price, and here public schools
have an overwhelming advantage: private schools charge tuition, public
schools do not.5 1 But other aspects of schooling-pedagogy, discipline,

46 See Asociacion de Educacion Privada de P.R., Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, No. 06-1146, 2007
WL 1064050, at *9 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2007) (objecting to state regulation of textbooks used
by private schools because regulations could conflict with a school's "particular philosophy,
methodology, or mission").
47 Between eight and thirteen percent of students enrolled in K-12 schools in the
United States are enrolled in religiously sponsored schools. See DeGroff, supra note 45, at
365 & nn.9-10 (citing and discussing various estimates).
48 For example, although Pierce allows the state to require that all schools, public and
private, religious and secular, inculcate civic virtue, states tread lightly in this area. See 268
U.S. at 534; R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TkADEOFFS: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND DIVERSITY 101-02 (2002). In part, this may be because, in balancing
normative and political factors, states might arrive at a wide range of views regarding
whether religious schools further or detract from their own educational goals. For example, some have suggested that sectarian schools may promote close-mindedness and intolerance. E.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 14-15, 28-30,
34-35 (1998); FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 91-92. On the other hand, states might welcome sectarian schools for their skill at conveying academic content, critical thinking, and
values; and, of course, they absorb much educational expense that otherwise would fall to
the state.
49 See, e.g., WILLIAM AYERS, ON THE SInE OF THE CHILD 16-18 (2003). See generally A.S.
NEILL, SUMMERHILL: A RADICAL APPROACH TO CHILD REARING (1960).
50See DeGroff, supra note 45, at 365.
51 See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 38-39 (citing cost as a "major issue" for
parents considering enrolling children in private schools).
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curricular and extracurricular programs, location-matter as well, and
52
matter to some parents enough that private schools have thrived.
In public schools, as in private schools, government regulation
works to limit the range of options available to parents along these dimensions. Public schools are much more tightly regulated than private
schools: the government is the public school, and virtually all features
of school policy are determined through some kind of public procedure consistent with democratic and constitutional constraints. For example, although government regulation of private schools must be
neutral as to religion and generally tolerates a range of points of view,
public schools must be areligious and embrace a point of view established through political/bureaucratic processes. 53 Local school district
democracy, local interest-group politics, hierarchical bureaucracy, collective bargaining by teachers and other professionals, and judicial
oversight have combined to create public systems that are often incredibly specific and directive with respect to what schools may do.
Thus, the market for schooling consists of private schools, which
are pervasively regulated but still permitted to vary in point of view and
in other ways, that compete for parents and students with bureaucratically organized public schools. The state shapes parental choices in this
market in three ways: it directly regulates private schools, it determines
the nature of public schools' programs, and, by competing with private
54
schools, it affects the mix of services that private schools offer.
B. Markets Across Jurisdictions
A second aspect of government regulation of schooling is simultaneously profoundly anticompetitive and, in a particular. but longunderstood way, conducive to a kind of school competition. This is
states' practice of dividing their territory into school districts and empowering those districts both to fund the schools they run with local tax
revenue and to provide services, usually exclusively and at least preferentially, to local residents. When the local district in which a parent
52

See infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.

53 See KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 64 (2005); YUDOF,

supra note 30, at 214-15, 233.
54

Of course, to treat government as a monolith in this context greatly oversimplifies;

there are many governments at work in education, and the one providing is not necessarily
the one regulating. With a few exceptions, local school district governments both provide
and regulate public education, but the states and (especially) Washington generally regu-

late without providing. Private schools, on the other hand, are primarily regulated by state
law and rule, with federal and district governments playing a more minimal role.
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lives is the only one where a parent may send a child tuition free, each
local school district is a monopoly provider. Parents unwilling to pay for
private schooling typically have, absent charters or magnets, only the
option of the district-run school, or sometimes a menu of schools, to
which their district assigns them. A parent might prefer the public
school one mile to the east of her home to the school five miles to the
west; but if her home sits on the western border of her school district,
that parent is out of luck.
The Supreme Court has gone out of its way to legitimize this practice. When the Court held in 1974 that suburban districts surrounding
an urban core could not be required to remedy the effects of the city
district's racial discrimination unless the suburban districts could be
shown themselves to have discriminated, it elevated educational localism to a federal quasi-constitutional norm.55 "No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools," stated the Court in Milliken v. Bradley; "local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to [the] quality of
the educational process." 56 In 1973, in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, the Court similarly reinforced localism by holding
that education is not a fundamental constitutional right, writing that
localized school funding does not "discriminat[e] against the 'poor'" in
the sense either of operating "to the peculiar disadvantage of any class
fairly definable as indigent" or "occasion [ing] an absolute deprivation"
of educational benefits.5 7 These cases fall short of holding that states
must, as a matter of federal constitutional law, organize public education along localist lines; but the powerful federal constitutional sanction localism enjoys has been eagerly seized upon by states, whose in58
terest-group politics make localism overwhelmingly popular.
Localism has long been criticized by education reformers. 59 Standard economic theory associates monopoly power with higher prices,
lower quality, and economic inefficiency. In schools these effects are
multiplied because customers not only have no options but are compelled by law to purchase the product. District-based schooling monopolies also reinforce educational inequity. Because housing markets
55See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
56 See id. at 741-42.
57411 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1973).

58See Aaron Saiger, Legislating Accountability, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1655, 1664-65,
1670 (2005).
59See, e.g, Ryan, supra note 40, at 276-78; Ryan & Heise, supra note 8, at 2063-64.
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are stratified by wealth, small, geographically compact school districts
segregate the rich from the poor. 60 Locally based funding thus allows
the rich to build excellent, well-funded schools for their children,
while the poor must relegate their own children, already more difficult to educate well than children of privilege, to the mediocre-or61
worse schools that they are able to afford.
The account of school districts as anticompetitive is tempered in
part by the recognition, famously associated with Charles Tiebout, that
in a system of small local jurisdictions providing locally-based public
62
goods, competition arises when people decide where to live. Consumers will elect to reside in the location that maximizes their utility across
different packages of local taxes and local services like schools.

63

In this

sense, public schools across district lines do compete with one another;64 rather than reflecting the economic inefficiency associated with
monopoly power, local monopolies competing interjurisdictionally are
65
a source of allocative efficiency.

Tieboutian sorting is, to be sure, a more attenuated way than an
ordinary market for the rich to pay for luxury goods and the poor to
pay for cheaper ones. 66 And it is only an approximation to describe

school selection as a Tieboutian market in which parents, in making
their choice of residence, move to the locality that bestsuits the level
of education for which they are willing and able to pay.67 Nevertheless,
60 See Ryan, supra note 40, at 276-78.
61 SeeJeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY 1, 14-17 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R.

Kemerer eds., 1999) ("Many families first decide precisely where they want their children to
go to school, and having done that, they find a house or apartment in the right location," but
the power to choose is unequally distributed with "income and wealth."); Ryan & Heise, supra
note 8, at 2064 (stating that "well-to-do parents ... have already exercised a form of school
choice" by "select[ing] where to live based on the quality of public schools").
62 See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416, 417 n.6,
418 (1956).
63 See id.
64 See Miguel Urquiola, Does School Choice Lead to Sorting?, 95 AM. ECON. REv. 1310, 1310
(2005) ("[1] nter-district or Tiebout choice is, and is likely to remain, the main form of
school choice in the United States.").
r See Caroline Hoxby, Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or Complements?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 57 (1996) (Tieboutian sorting does not "actually achiev[e]
allocative efficiency" but "it makes a sizable dent").
66 See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 755, 808-09 (2004).
67 This is true for several straightforward reasons. Families make no direct payments to
schools. All residents with property, including nonparents, pay school taxes. Renters pay
differently than property owners, depending on how much of the school tax burden the
rental market permits landlords to pass on to tenants; if rent is regulated or demand
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the core insight of the Tieboutian model is sound: the quality of public schooling in a given district is reflected in consumers' residential
decisions and affects home values and rental rates at all levels of the
housing market.68 The purchase or rental of housing, because it buys
access to a particular set of schools otherwise unavailable, is effectively
69
a roundabout method of paying tuition.
Nor can there be any question that by making public schooling a
Tieboutian good, rather than one that can be purchased A la carte,
government severely limits competition. A Tieboutian good must be
purchased in a bundle that includes other public goods and also a
particular residence. This makes schools less competitive than they
would be if parents could select their preferred school anew at the
beginning of each term. 70 Moreover, the poor are particularly hurt by

making schools Tieboutian goods, because buying or renting a home,
the only way to purchase a seat in a desired school district, requires
substantial capital outlay. A household's willingness to pay for a bundle of local taxes and local services is, in Tiebout's theory, subject to
its budget constraint. 71 Poor families have less choice, therefore, in
selecting a school in our current Tieboutian world of competing local
monopolies than they would if, for example, schools were funded
through state taxes and states permitted enrollment in any school in
the state. 72 The more economically stratified a community, moreover,
the greater the limitation placed upon the choices of the less well off.
C. School Choice as Regulatory Reform
73
By "relax[ing] constraints on students' mobility among schools,"
charters, vouchers, and similar initiatives introduce additional compehighly elastic, renters may pay almost nothing. Parents of many children, or of children
with special needs, do not pay more by virtue of such circumstances. People with more
property pay more than people with less, even if both groups use the schools in the same
way. Rich neighborhoods can contain some cheap housing, and the nonaffluent children
who live in this housing get to use the rich schools on the same basis as everybody else, and
vice-versa.
68 See WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5-6 (2001).

69 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(explaining that choice is "routinely exercised" by "those with greater means"); Reynolds,
supra note 66, at 773-74.
70 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 92.
71 See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 773-74.
72 This proposal is advanced in Paul Dimond, School Choice and the Democratic Ideal of
Free Common Schools, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 323, 335 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson
eds., 2005).
73 CAROLINE HoxBY, THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 10 (2003).
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tition into the educational quasi-market. 74 Vouchers-state subsidies
that parents may direct to private schools in which they enroll their
children-reconfigure the school type market by reducing the barrier
that cost presents to parents who would otherwise prefer private to
public education. In addition, the various forms of public education,
and the facilitation of choice among them, have proliferated. For example, often in an effort to promote both racial integration and
school quality, many states and districts supplement traditional, statemanaged public schools (that all children from a given area attend)
with magnet schools. 75 Quality concerns also motivate districts to en-

ter into contracts with private educational management organizations
("EMOs"), which provide not just administrative services but general
76
management to struggling public schools.
The most dramatic market-based reform in the public school sector is the charter school. Chartering permits groups of educational
entrepreneurs from both within and without an existing public system 77 to constitute a public school not subject to the full panoply of
rules and procedures imposed by the school district in which it is located; the extent of regulatory relief varies by state. 78 Charter schools
receive state money for each student who chooses to enroll, money
that otherwise would go to those students' traditionally assigned public schools. 79 The charter school sector is growing explosively.8°

74 See Christopher Lubienski, Public Schools in Marketized Environments: Shifting Incentives
and Unintended Consequences of Competition-Based EducationalReform, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 464,
464 (2005) (calling this process "marketization").
75 See SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 244; Douglas A. Archbald, School Choice, Magnet
Schools, and the LiberationMode4 77 Soc. EDUC. 283, 283 (2004).
76 See ALEX MOLNAR, SCHOOL COMMERCIALISM: FROM DEMocRATIC IDEAL TO MARKET
COMMODITY 124-27 (2005); KENNETH SALTMAN, THE EDISON SCHOOLS: CORPORATE SCHOOLING AND THE ASSAULT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 67 (2005); Henry M. Levin, Studying Privatization

in Education, in PRIVATING EDUCATION 3, 7 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Ddegation,103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1389 (2003).
77 Some states permit these groups to include EMOs. See MURPHY & SHIFFMAN, supra
note 9, at 51-52; see also GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER NELSON, WHAT'S PUBLIC ABOUT
CHARTER SCHOOLS? 170-93 (2002) (analyzing EMO participation under the Michigan charter law).
78 See MURPHY & SHIFFMAN, supra note 9, at 53; Arnold F. Shober et al., Flexibility Meets

Accountability: State CharterSchool Laws and Their Influence on the Formationof CharterSchools in
the United States, 34 POL'Y STUD.J. 563, 567-69 & tbl.1 (2006); Sandra Vergari, The Politics of
CharterSchools, 21 EDUC. POL'Y 15, 15 (2007).
79See MURPHY & SHrMAN, supra note 9, at 57-61; Vergari, supranote 78, at 24.
0 See THOMAS L. GOOD &JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE 114 (2000);
MURPHY & SHIFrMAN, supra note 9, at 32-34.
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Traditional public schools, magnets, EMO-managed schools, charters, and voucher-accepting private schools all compete with one another for parents and students. That competition is delimited by regulations all around. For example, among public schools that charge no
tuition, admission is controlled by factors other than willingness to
pay.8 1 Magnets and charters are regulated by the state, though not in
the same way as traditional public schools. EMOs are subject to public
supervision and often detailed contracts. Still, in its willingness to experiment with the forms of both public and private schooling-by authorizing magnets, establishing charters, or permitting private schools
to cash government-funded school vouchers-government expands the
options available to consumers of schooling. Even without a price
mechanism, schools can compete on nonprice dimensions as diverse as
the contents of the instructional program, teaching styles, athletics, and
82
geographical location.
Choice programs have obvious potential to mitigate the inequities
of Tieboutian competition. Traditional public schools, magnets, charters, and voucher-supported private schools could all be made available
to parents regardless of residence. 83 This would weaken the link between home purchase and school quality, and thus reduce the inefficiencies and differential burdens that sorting imposes upon the poor.84
For reasons oriented more towards politics than policy, however, states
have rarely used choice in this way. One exception is magnet schools,
which, oriented towards desegregation, often seek to attract white students from suburban districts to specialized programs offered by majority-minority districts closer to the urban core. But vouchers and charters
hew closely to the localist paradigm. The voucher program in Cleveland,
81 See PAUL T. HILL & ROBINJ. LAKE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUB-

LIC EDUCATION 4 (2002) (discussing charter admission by lottery); MIRON & NELSON, supra note 77, at 72 (noting charters' ability to control their student bodies through marketing and cream-skimming notwithstanding formal norms of equal access); SALAMONE, supra
note 35, at 245 (comparing charter admission by lottery to first-come-first-served).
82 See Lubienski, supra note 74, at 467-68.
a SeeJohn Coons, DodgingDemocracy, 111 Am.J. EDUC. 596, 606-07 (2005).
8 See, e.g., JOHN CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
210 (1990) (The most promising choice systems now in operation are those that have
moved aggressively toward the elimination of fixed jurisdictions and assignments.");
GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 5; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now
116-35 (2001); KATHRYN A. MCDERMOTr, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM

VERSUS EQUrrY 121, 131-34 (1999); Alan Wolfe, The Irony of School Choice, in SCHOOL
CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 31, 31-32 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003); Coons, supra note 83, at

605; James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There First, 93
GEO. LJ. 1287, 1311 (2005); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice To Achieve Desegregation,74 FORDHAM L. REv. 791, 795 (2005); Ryan, supra note 40, at 310-15.
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for example, made interdistrict public school choice unattractive8 and
barred private schools outside of Cleveland from receiving voucher
monies at all.8 6 Charter schools are typically restricted to students residing in the district where they are located and indeed are often chartered
by the districts themselves. 8 7 And enrollment in public schools outside
of one's own district is made difficult if it is even allowed.88
School choice, then, is a regulatory reform of an idiosyncratic
quasi-market. The quasi-market itself is required by the Federal Constitution under Pierce, and reinforced by a Court-sanctioned localism. At
the same time, state government regulation of educational services
strongly limits competition and the ability of ordinary market mechanisms to function in that market. It does so by compelling school attendance, by directing massive funding towards tuition-free public
schools whose program and policies are set through hierarchical and
democratic processes, by restricting competition among public schools
to Tiebout-style interjurisdictional competition, and by pervasively
regulating the private school industry. Contemporary "school choice"
programs selectively graft some procompetitive features onto this regulatory regime. They permit some kinds of intradistrict and interdistrict
competition through magnets, private management, charters, and
vouchers.8 9 Still, they fall well short of undermining the overarching
regulatory touchstones of public monopoly on subsidized education
and Tieboutian competition.
I.

CHOICE UNDER THE EDUCATION CLAUSES

Given this perspective on what "school choice" programs do, what
limits should the education clauses be seen as placing upon them? To
answer this question, this Part turns to the clauses themselves. The first
Section reviews the education clauses and two key state cases interpreting the clauses' compatibility with choice, one overturning a voucher
program in Florida90 and the other upholding the Ohio charter school

85 See

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 707 & n.17 (SouterJ., dissenting).

8 Id. at 645 (majority opinion).

See MURPHY & SHIFFMAN, supra note 9, at 54.
88 The Heritage Found., Where's School Choice?, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Education/SchoolChoice/schoolchoice.cfm (Apr. 19, 2005) (map showing all fourteen
states which mandate interdistrict or intradistrict school choice).
89 The Heritage Found., supra note 88 (graph showing states which mandate interdistrict or intradistrict school choice and have voucher programs).
90 Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 413 (Fla. 2006).
87
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law against a facial challenge. 91 The second Section analyzes the crucial
institutional language-that states support "public" or "common"
schooling-and argues that these terms resist historical and textualist
interpretation. 92 The final Section argues that although "public schooling" can be legitimately understood to require direct, statist provision
of schooling, which makes choice problematic, it can equally legitimately be interpreted pluralistically, in ways compatible with charters
and vouchers. 93 Lacking strong textual, historical, or purpose-based
arguments to the contrary, state courts should acknowledge that both
approaches are valid under the education clauses, and leave the choice
between them to the people and their elected representatives.
Not all choice programs meet the requirement of publicness or
commonness, however. A pluralist understanding of these terms imposes important constraints upon choice programs. The nature of
94
those limitations is analyzed in Part II.
A. The ConstitutionalMandate
Every state constitution has a clause that discusses primary and
secondary education. 95 In Florida, to take a state discussed at greater
length below, the constitution requires that "[a]dequate provision shall
be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality
system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education." 96 The Ohio constitution, also discussed below, requires
its General Assembly to "make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as ... will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state. " 97 The New Jersey constitution, in a famous provision that has generated decades of litigation and mountains
of scholarly analysis, mandates a "thorough and efficient system of free
public" primary and secondary schools.98 Other states' clauses, al91 Ohio ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d
1148, 1166 (Ohio 2006); infra notes 95-125.
92 See infra notes 126-191.
93See infta notes 192-223.
9 See infta notes 224-350.
9 See state education clauses cited supra note 1.
9 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
97OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
H See NJ CONST. art. VIII, § 4(1). See generally Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450
(N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990); Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities,and Priorities:New
Jersey's Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 615 (2004)
(cataloguing the progress of the Abbott litigation).
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though they vary in scope and in specific language, generally deploy
subsets of a constellation of key terms: education should be "thorough,"
"public," "common," "free," "general," "uniform," "efficient."99
These requirements constrain the organization of school systems
in two ways. First, school finance cases in many states have held that
terms in the education clauses like "thorough," "equal," and "efficient" impose the substantive duty upon states to ensure that all children are educated adequately and/or equally.100 The fiscal and remedial focus of these cases 0 1 has obscured the direct applicability of the
clauses to how schooling is organized and regulated. 0 2 The institutional design underlying policymaking, budgeting, and student assignment has substantive impact upon policies, budgets, and assignments. That institutional design, therefore, must serve the substantive
10 3
requirements of adequacy and/or equity.
At the same time, the clauses speak directly to the organization
of educational institutions. Requirements that state-supported schooling be "free," "uniform," "common," and "public" can be read to require some organizational approaches and arguably to preclude others.'0 4 Even if it were to be established that school choice promoted
educational adequacy and equity, state support for charter or voucher
9 See McUsic, supranote 1, at 319-26.
100See generally Enrich, supra note 4; Heise, EqualEducational Opportunity, supra note 4;
Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 4.
101 See Ryan, supra note 40, at 260 (1999); Aaron Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the
Contingent School District,84 N.C. L. Rxv. 857, 894-95 (2006).
102 See Andrew Broy, Comment, CharterSchools and EducationalReform, 79 N.C. L. REv.
493, 535 (2001).
103 See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory, 14 J.L. &
POL. 411, 432 (1998) ("Increasingly clear is that a structural approach to school reform
can bear directly on the nature and quality of the education provided."); cf. SimmonsHarris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999) (noting, but summarily rejecting, the
argument that "implicit" in the constitutional requirement to establish "thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the State" is "a prohibition against the
establishment of a system of uncommon (or nonpublic) schools financed by the state").
104 Frank Kemerer provides a preliminary assessment of the extent to which state constitutions' institutional provisions are friendly to vouchers. See Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 181-83 tbls.1 & 2
(1998). Most standard taxonomies of state education clauses, however, parse constitutional
language exclusively for friendliness to finance claims and focus upon terms plausibly relevant to educational quality such as "thorough," "efficient," and "adequate." See McUsic,
supra note 1, at 309 n.4, 319-26, 334-39; Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tx. L. Rxv. 777, 814-16 (1985). "Uniform" does figure in these taxonomies, but exclusively as a synonym for "equal." Of course,
the variations in terminology and phrasing the taxonomists identify do not perfectly track
state court interpretation. See Brian L. White, Comment, PotentialFederal and State ConstitutionalBarriersto the Success of School Vouchers, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 889, 928 (2001).

"2007]

School Choice & States' Duty to Support "Public"Schools

programs might still be foreclosed by requirements that such support
be limited to "common," "public," "free," and/or "uniform" schools.
Moreover, requirements that schooling be "thorough" or "efficieni"
have an independent institutional dimension. Whether "efficient" i.:
read as a mandate for productive efficiency, in the sense of minimizing cost-per-output and avoiding waste, 10 5 or allocative efficiency, in
the sense of seizing potential Pareto improvements and minimizing
deadweight loss, the term on its face has more to say about how
schooling is structured than about the nature of the product that it
generates. "Thorough," a twin term of "efficiency," more plausibly addresses educational adequacy-to be thorough is to ignore no major
area-but also plausibly bars haphazardness in administration along
with demanding comprehensiveness in pedagogy and fairness in
funding.
Until recently, whether choice is directly precluded by institutional
language received relatively little judicial attention. In 2006, however, in
Ohio ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents& Teachers v. State Board ofEducation,
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state's charter
school legislation was facially inconsistent with the Ohio education
clause's requirement of "a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state." 10 6 The court emphasized that commu10 7
(as charters are called in Ohio) incorporate "flexibility,"
nity schools
"choice," 108 "customiz[ation],"109 and "experimen [t]"110 to help "ensur[e] that all children receive an adequate education that complies
with the Thorough and Efficient Clause." 1 ' The court held that rational judgment, coupled with charters' ultimate susceptibility to public
105 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (defining "efficiency" in part as "no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level");
DIANE RAvrrCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 191-92 (1974) (documenting historical con-

cern over efficiency in its waste-avoiding sense); Paul Peterson, Thorough and Efficient Private and Public Schools, in COURTING FAILURE 195, 195 (Eric Hanushek ed., 2006) ("'thorough and efficient' appears to ask of schools that they ... provide the highest-quality
schooling at the lowest price").
106 Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d 1 23-26 (quoting OHIO CONST. art.
VI, § 2). Plaintiffs made several other claims, also rejected, based on more idiosyncratic
provisions of the Ohio constitution. See id. 11 41, 62. Most other lawsuits arguing that charter laws are unconstitutional have asserted particular inadequacies in program design or
the drafting of the enabling statutes. See Robert Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to
CharterSchools, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 43, 51, 68-85 (2004).
107 Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d 130.
108 Id. 1 31.
109 Id. 32.
110 Id. 1 31.
"I Id. 1 30.
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control, to be sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of
112
commonness, thoroughness, and efficiency.
15
The Florida Supreme Court, in the 2006 case Bush v. Holmes,"
took the opposite approach in invalidating the state's Opportunity
Scholarship Program ("OSP"),114 which provided school vouchers, redeemable at private, tuition-charging schools as well as public schools,
to students previously enrolled in public schools that the state had
categorized as "failing."115 The Florida court reasoned that because
vouchers "diver[t]" funds from free public schools to private schools,
they undermine "the system of 'high quality'" schools' 16 that the state
constitution requires." 7 Furthermore, said the court, the constitution
requires state support of schools both "free" and "public," quality aside;
private schools receiving vouchers are neither." 8 Because the OSP
funds schools subject to less extensive regulation than the public
schools, the court found that it violates the requirement that the public

112 See Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers,'857 N.E.2d 11 31, 33. For similarly deferential
approaches, see Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. About Parochiaid, Inc. v. Engler, 566
N.W.2d 208, 217-18 (Mich. 1997) (Michigan charter law consistent with requirement that
state support "public" schools); Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212 (Cleveland voucher
program consistent with requirement that schools be "thorough and efficient"); Jackson v.
Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 627-28 (Wis. 1998) (Milwaukee vouchers consistent with requirement that schools be "uniform"); see also Martin, supra note 106, at 51, 68-69 (collecting cases rejecting claims that choice schools are unconstitutional because they do not "fall
clearly under the supervision and control of the state board of education"); Broy, supra
note 102, at 535-45 (collecting and analyzing cases on constitutionality of charter schools).
"1 919 So. 2d at 400. For early summaries of the case, see Douglas N. Harris, Carolyn
D. Herrington & Amy Albee, The Future of Vouchers: Lessons From the Adoption, Design, and
Court Challenges of Florida'sThree VoucherPrograms,21 EDUC. POL'Y 215, 235-36 (2007); Brad
Kahn, Note, Bush v. Holmes: School Vouchers and State Constitutions,9 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 833 (2006). For commentary, see generally Jamie Dycus, Lost Opportunity, 35J.L. &
EDUC. 415 (2006); Clark Neily, The FloridaSupreme Court vs. School Choice: A 'Uniformly'Horrid Decision, 10 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 401 (2006) (analysis by the losing plaintiffs counsel);
Florida Supreme Court Holds Use of Public Monies to Fund PrivateAlternatives to Public Schools
Violates the FloridaConstitution,33 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 1234, 1237-39 (2006).
114 For a political and legislative history of OSP and related Florida programs, see Harris et al., supra note 113, at 219-33.
115 See Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 400.
116

Id. at 409.

117

The relevant constitutional language reads:
It is ...a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be
made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of
free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education ....

art. IX, § 1.
FLA.1CONST.
18
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 410-11.
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school "system be 'uniform.'" 119 Finally, the Florida court concludedover a vigorous dissent12 0-that the Florida constitution specifies a single "manner" by which the state may discharge its duty to educate
school-age children, that being a "uniform, high quality system of free
public education." 121 Choice is not allowed even if it meets the state's
educational goals: the constitution, says the court, "does not authorize
additional equivalent alternatives."122
Although Holmes invalidated a voucher program, its reasoning
clearly extends beyond vouchers to charter schools. If OSP's "diversion"
of funds from public schools to private ones unconstitutionally undermines public schools, charter schools' similar diversion is unconstitutional as well.123 And if a voucher program violates the "uniformity"
provision because voucher schools are subject to regulations less intrusive and onerous than traditional schools, charter schools, whose sine
qua non. is regulatory relief, violate it similarly.1 24 A fortiori if the state
education clause mandates, as the Florida Supreme Court says that it
does, a unique "manner" of providing public education, to the exclusion of any "additional equivalent alternatives," charters are by defini125
tion unconstitutional.

119 Id. at 409.
120 Id. at 415-16 (Bell, J., dissenting).
121Id. at 408 (majority opinion).
122 Id.
123 The Ohio court explicitly rejected this argument, holding that permitting state
funds to follow charter students did not unconstitutionally make traditional public schools
less "thorough and efficient" by depriving them of monies that, absent charters, they
would have had. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d 1 38-39 (refusing to characterize charter funding mechanism as "raiding local funds that school districts are otherwise entitled to receive"). A variation on this argument, that choice in impoverished communities is unconstitutional because it diverts monies that would otherwise flow to traditional
public schools that need full resources to meet the obligation of adequacy under state
education clauses, is also sometimes made. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that in
theory such diversion could present a constitutional problem, but sent a case raising the
question back to the trial judge for more factfimding on the question. See In re Grant of
Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on Palisades, 753 A.2d 687, 698 (N.J. 2000); Martin, supra note 106, at 73-74. The New York Court of Appeals, confronting a similar argument, kept it alive by dismissing the case raising the argument on technical grounds. See
Bd. of Educ. of the Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y.,
723 N.YS.2d 262, (N.Y 2001); Martin, supra note 106, at 73-74. But see William E. Thro,
JudicialAnalysis Duringthe Third Wave of School Finance Litigation,35 B.C. L. REv. 597, 615-16
(1994) (stating that a "deficiency in the public school system theoretically could become
the basis for a public school voucher program... so that each child could reach his or her
potential").
124 Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409.
125 Id. at 408.
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B. Interpretingthe InstitutionalRequirements
The broad generalities and terse formulations that characterize the
rights-bearing provisions of the Federal Constitution have been contrasted with state constitutions' often prolix treatment of wide ranges of
quotidian concerns.1 26 But although the latter variety of provisions can
be relevant to educational organization, 127 the education clauses themselves use general, capacious formulations: schools must be "public,"
"common," "free," "uniform." Like the open-ended vocabulary of the
Federal Bill of Rights- "search," "free speech," "free exercise," "establishment"-these terms are open ended, multivalent, and resistant to
128
either exclusively historical or exclusively textualist interpretation.
State constitutions combine these terms in various permutations
and embed them in a range of contexts.129 Nevertheless, in every state,
the primary question with respect to the permissibility of choice is how
to interpret the requirement that states support "public" or "common"
schools. 130 The question is difficult because "public school" denotes an
supra note 2, at 51.
127For example, in Ohio, litigants challenging the constitutionality of vouchers won

126 See SAGER,

(for a time) by citing the state constitution's one-subject rule. Simmons-Harris,711 N.E.2d
at 214-15. The more recent Ohio challenge to the constitutionality of charter schools cited
not only the state's education clause but also constitutional provisions regulating the distribution of tax revenue to districts and limitations upon state loan guarantees to private
entities. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d 11 48-72. See also Kemerer, supra note
104, at 183 tbl.2 (tabulating constitutional provisions relevant to choice).
128See SAGER, supra note 2, at 51; Aaron Saiger, ConstitutionalPartnershipand the States,
73 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 1439, 1454 & n.84 (2005).
129See state education clauses cited supra note 1.
130 Thirty-eight of fifty education clauses require states to support "public" schools. See
state education clauses cited supra note 1. A thirty-ninth state constitution, Mississippi's,
specifies "public" schools, but says they need be supported only "upon such conditions and
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201. McUsic concludes that this language "requir[es] the Mississippi legislature to establish schools, although it does not mandate the type of schools." McUsic, supra note 1, at 311 n.5.
Seven additional states-Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, and
Oregon-mandate support of "common" rather than "public" schools. See state education
clauses cited supra note 1.
The four remaining states use neither "common" nor "public": Alabama, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See state education clauses cited supra note 1. Alabama's
clause, providing that "nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense," is the result of a 1956
amendment that attempted to limit racial integration after Brown v. Board of Education. See
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The amendment repealed language
requiring the state to "establish, organize, and maintain a liberal system of public schools
throughout the state." See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 (note of code commissioner). An
Alabama trial court has held the amendment invalid and the older language still in force
because of the amendment's "racially discriminatory motivations." See id. (the Alabama
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agglomeration of ambiguous features rather than a single concept. 13 1
Some of these features are crucial to "publicness" while others are accidental. Moreover, the aspects of "publicness" correlate imperfectly. And
because they are also continuous rather than binary characteristics,
even were it obvious which meaning or meanings of "public school"
should control, drawing necessary lines would remain far from straightforward.
The above-cited cases, Holmes in Florida and Ohio Congress of Parents
& Teachers in Ohio, seem almost willfully to ignore these complexities.1 32 Holmes identifies the constitutional term "public schools"133 with
the entirety of the structural regime governing Florida's actual public
schools-as it existed before marketized incentives were introducedand bars any other "manner" of schooling. 134 It does not explain why
this particular, contingent structure, including features manifestly unreflective of any important norm of publicness, deserves such deference. The effect is to strangle innovation and to constitutionalize a
flawed status quo. Ohio, by contrast, defines a "public" or "common"
school as any that is ultimately subject to public control. 135 Ultimate
public control being a particularly undemanding standard, the dissent's
claim that the court had blessed "any schooling arrangement that the
General Assembly decides to support by general taxation" 13 6 seems a
fair one.1 3 7 The Ohio court explains neither why it elevates the single
feature of public control as the absolute criterion for publicness, nor

Supreme Court's failure to uphold trial court's view leaves the status of § 256 "complex
and controversial"). The Supreme Court of Vermont has held, notwithstanding the absence of the term "public" in chapter 2, section sixty-eight, of the Vermont Constitution,
that under that section "[p]ublic education is a constitutional obligation of the state." Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 392 (Vt. 1995). The West Virginia courts have read that state's
constitution's requirement of "free schools" to mean "public schools." See W. VA. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421, 436 (W. Va. 1973).
Wisconsin's constitution requires the "establishment of district schools." Wis. CONST. art.

X, § 3.
131See Frederick Hess, What Is a "Public School?" Principlesfor a New Century, 85 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 433, 435-48 (2004).
132 See generally Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392; Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d

1148.
133 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
'34 Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409.
135 Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers, 857 N.E.2d
30.
136 Id. 81 (Resnick, J., dissenting). But see id. 1 32 (majority opinion) (denyingJustice
Resnick's assertion that it was prepared to "approve of just any schooling arrangement'").
137 The majority's conclusion annotates an authority with a telling parenthetical: "[A]
court has nothing to do with the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislature." Id. 1 73.
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why it identifies one point on the spectrum of such control-the power
of the state ultimately to trump private control if government wishes-instead of focusing on who controls day-to-day, or the extent of institutional resistance that private managers can exert to oppose public preferences. The Ohio court's extreme deference to legislative preference
essentially reads the institutional limitations of the education clauses
out of its constitution entirely.
The complexities associated with a more sophisticated take on the
interpretive problem can be seen most clearly, perhaps, with the benefit
of the historical perspective offered by the nine states whose education
clauses require them to support "common" schools.' 38 Lay and legal usage long regarded "common school" and "public school" as synonyms. 139 However, because the former term today has largely fallen out
of ordinary discourse, its presence in state constitutions often generates
historically-based arguments that "public school" does not. Thus, the
dissent in Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers, relying upon historical
scholarship, 14° argues that charters are incompatible with "a single system of common schools" 141 because the framers of the Ohio education
clause would have understood that phrase to exclude "a proliferating
variety of available schools, competition among schools for tax support,
and attendance by parental selection, rather than public assignment."142
Horace Mann and others' concept of the "common school"
doubtless influenced the framing of many education clauses, including Ohio's. 43 "Common schooling," however, named a multifaceted
138 In addition to the seven states-Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, and Oregon-whose education clauses use the term "common school" instead of
"public school," see state education clauses cited supra note 1, the California and Ohio
constitutions use both "common" and "public." CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; OHIo CONST. art.

VI, §§ 2-3.
1s9 See L. S. Tellier, What Is Common or Public School Within Contemplation of Constitutional
or Statutory Provisions, 113 A.L.R. 697, 697 (1938) (collecting cases); cf. BENJAMIN JUSTICE,
THE WAR THAT WASN'T 2 (2004).

140 Molly O'Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School, 51 CLEv. ST.
L. REV. 581, 638-40 (2004) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2).
141 OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
14 O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140, at 638-39; see 857 N.E.2d 11 82-87 (Resnick,

J., dissenting).
143 SeeJOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 238 (2006);

Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky
Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 356-59 (1991) (positing "common schools" as equalizing
treatment of "rich and poor"); Chris Lubienski, Redefining 'Public'Education:CharterSchools,
Common Schools, and the Rhetoric of Reform, 103 TCHRS. C. REc. 634, 645-54 (2001); Nathaniel J. McDonald, Note, Ohio CharterSchools and EducationalPrivatization,53 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
467, 478-80 (2005-06).

See generally CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COM-
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political program and described a set of complex institutions. Precisely because the term was in general use and was not a term of art, 144
it is difficult to know which aspects of the common school concept
various framers meant to constitutionalize-beyond that all children
should be eligible for an education at state expense-and which attributes are contingent.
Inarguably, common schooling operated by state assignment rather
than parental choice. This policy stemmed from an explicit goal of
"break[ing] down class distinctions," providing "equal opportunity," and
helping to "bridge ethnic and religious divisions" among students. 145 But
where Molly O'Brien and Amanda Woodrum conclude that a necessary
feature of "common schools" is therefore that children of all classes and
backgrounds be educated together, 146 others read the record to indicate
only that a system of common schools must provide every child with access to schooling free of charge. 147 Paul Dimond likewise understands
attendance by parental selection, rather than public assignment, to be
fully compatible with a system of "common schools"; to him that public
assignment characterized the early common school is merely an artifact. 14a Other scholars and historians, depending on their own focus and
their reading of the sources, have identified as foundational commitments of common school advocates nonsectarianism, 149 compulsory

MON SCHOOL (1988) (analyzing history of the "common school" idea); O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140.
1'
4O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140, at 587 (stating that the "meaning of the term
common school' was so clear to the framers of the 1851 [Ohio] Constitution that its definition hardly merited serious discussion").
145 Stephen Macedo, Equity and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE,

supra46note 84, at 53, 57.
1 O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140, at 588.
147 Dimond, supra note 72, at 323 (stating that common schools are "tuition-free
schools open to all regardless of family income"). Lloyd Joregenson concurs that access,
rather than utilization, of free schooling was the common school's critical feature. LLOYD
JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 20 (1987) (explaining that common
schooling included a goal to "provide schooling for all white children, partially or wholly at
public expense").
148 Dimond, supra note 72, at 324 (stating that a school is "not common" unless it is
open to all families regardless of income").
149 See GLENN, supra note 143, at 275; see also O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140, at
640 (arguing that choice "run [s] counter to the constitutional vision" of "common schooling" because it "promote [s] separate schooling for children of discrete ethnic or religious
backgrounds"). Common school reformers, of course, were aggressively Protestant and
"nonsectarian" only within their Protestant context; with respect to non-Protestants, they
were sectarian indeed. See Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic
Values Are Ill-Served by DemocraticForms of Schooling, in NoMos XLIII: MORAL & POLITICAL
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school attendance, 150 local control, 15 1 the centralization 152 and profes154
sionalization of governance, 153 the standardization of curriculum,
and the spreading of a "pan-Protestant" form of "moral and social redemption."155 Moreover, some of these ideals were honored mostly in

the breach; 15 6 and, as Carl Kaesde argues, right away people conflated,
sometimes purposefully, the ideology of the common school with more
particular programs of school reform. 157 Certainly curricular standardiEDUCATION 106-14 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002); see also infra note 155 and
accompanying text.
150 See DINAN, supranote 143, at 237-47; JORGENSON, supra note 147, at 22.
151 SeeJUSTICE, supra note 139, at 28-29.
152 See CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC 112, 147-48, 151, 221 (1983).
153 See id. at 221.
154 See DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL REFORMS 21-25
(2000); WILLIAM

J.

REESE, AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FROM THE COMMON SCHOOL TO

"No CHILD LEFT BEHIND" 64 (2005). The pedagogical uniformity of the common school,
its "common stock of ideas," REESE, supra, at 64, was later understood by both its proponents and detractors to conflict with a range of curricular reforms, including both progressive, child-centered education, and the teaching of elite academic subjects like Latin
and Greek in high schools. RAVITCH, supra, at 163-64 (describing the opposition of progressive educators like John Franklin Bobbitt to the core curriculum of the common
schools); REESE, supra, at 99, 107, 109, 157; DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON
BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at 74, 110 (2003).

Tyack et al. also cite and discuss the "celebrated" case of Stuart v. School District No. 1 of Village of Kalamazoo, which rejected arguments "that the term common or primary schools, as
made use of in our legislation, has a known and definite meaning which limits it to the
ordinary district schools" and prohibits them from offering "a higher grade of learning."
See 1874 WL 6396, at *5 (Mich. 1874); TYACK ET AL., supra, at 74.
155 JORGENSON, supra note 147, at 20-23 (positing that the seeking of such redemption
is the "most fundamental assumption underlying the Common School Movement"); SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 20-21 (associating common schooling with the anti-Catholic
Blaine Amendments and quoting President Ulysses Grant's support for universal "common
school education unmixed with atheistic, pagan, or sectarian teaching"). The "common
core of values" was at the core of Mann's interest in common schooling. See GLENN, supra
note 143, at 8; SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 14-15.
156 For example, California's 1852 Act to Establish a System of Common Schools included among those common schools publicly funded private and religious institutions. See
TYACK ET AL., supra note 154, at 90. Public funding of religious schools was repealed three
years later. See id. at 91; see also SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 8 (defining the "myth of the
common school" as being that "the values promoted through public education are indeed
neutral or at the very least acceptable to Americans across the political and religious spectrum").
157 See KAESTLE, supra note 152, at 95. As Carl Kaestle explained:

Although the reformers' specific proposals about centralized supervision, tax
support, teacher training, and consolidated school districts met considerable
resistance, the educational reform cause benefited in general from widespread consensus about the importance of common schooling .... The rhetorical effect was to imply that if one was against centralization, supervision,
new schoolhouses, teacher training, or graded schools, one must also be
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zation-and a fortiori "pan-Protestantism" and the corollary anti-Catholicism and nativism that contaminated the common school platform' 5 8 -should not be deemed constitutional requirements because of
constitutional language requiring states to promote "common schools."
The difficulty of determining which of their numerous features are
necessary, which are political, and which are accidental arises equally in
defining what makes a "public" or "common" school in our own time.
The line between "public" and "private" schools, never entirely clearcut,159 has become increasingly fuzzy as the explosion of institutional
forms in education 160 challenges any discrete partition of the two sectors. 16 1 A public school turned over to an EMO charges no tuition, and
generally continues to guarantee admission to all neighborhood children, but it is run by a private firm that hires, fires, and sets educational
policy.162 An EMO's choices in these areas are constrained by the terms
of a contract negotiated with its public-sector client and by the more
general business goal of keeping one's clients happy, but they remain
private choices.1 63 Is such a school public?64 Is a magnet school, government-managed and government-funded, public if children must apply and are selected based upon academic achievement, racial group,
or some other criterion? 165 Similarly, charter schools are subject to
some public regulation, hold their charters at the pleasure of public
authority, and generally charge no tuition. Yet, charters can rely on private as well as public funds and some are for-profit. Public regulation,
moreover, is much looser than in traditional public schools, and admission can be, like magnet or theme schools, competitive. 166 If the charter
next door to Bobby's house is returning profits to private investors and

against morality, good order, intelligent citizenship, economic prosperity, fair
opportunity, and a common American culture.
Id.; see also O'Brien & Woodrum, supra note 140, at 602 (discussing the association of
.graded schools and common schools).
158 SeeJoRGENSON, supra note 147, at 28; SALAMONE, supra note 35, at 17; McConnell,
supra note 149, at 110.
159 SeeTYACK ET AL., supra note 154, at 27-28.
160 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
161 See Hess, supra note 131, at 433.
162 See Metzger, supra note 76, at 1390.
163 See id.

164 For critics emphatically answering this question in the negative, see MOLNAR, supra
note 76, at 16; SALTMAN, supranote 76, at 10.
16 See Archbald, supra note 75, at 284.
16 See HILL & LAKE, supra note 81, at 4-5; Vergari, supra note 78, at 16-17.
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need not admit Bobby, is it public in a way that a state-regulated private
167
school is not?
More broadly, one might note that important aspects of "publicness," in the sense of openness to all comers, are sacrificed when traditional "public" schools sort children by geographic location 168 or disability.1 69 Nor are state-regulated private schools themselves an
unproblematic category. States help such schools defray various expenses, including for transportation, supplies, textbooks, the teaching
of secular subjects to children at risk for failure, and special education.1 70 How much of its budget can a regulated private school receive
from the government and still be private?
Nor can much traction be gained in those states where education
clauses include the somewhat more specific requirements that states
support public or common schools that are also "free"1 71 or "uni-

167See MItoN & NELSON, supra note 77, at 202 tbl.ll.1; Christopher Lubienski, Instrumentalist Perspectives on the "Public" in Public Education, 17 EDUC. POL'Y 478, 482 (2003)
[hereinafter Lubienski, InstrumentalistPerspectives] (explaining that "charter schools explicitly blur the boundaries between public and private organizational types"); Lubienski, supra note 143, at 641, 656-57 (arguing that charters are less "public" than traditional public
schools because they are often for-profit, do not have open records, "mirror private
schools in areas such as staffing, asset management, admissions practices, and administration," and lack "democratic control"); Metzger, supra note 76, at 1389 (arguing that although charter schools "are officially denominated public schools [and] come into existence as a result of government authorization," they "also embody substantial private
involvement").
168 See supra notes 126-191.
169 Current education law requires students with disabilities to be educated in the
"least restrictive environment" possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) (2004). This approach
acknowledges a necessity for some sorting by disability, even as it is to be minimized.
170 See Macedo, supra note 145, at 52; Joseph M. O'Keefe, Catholic Schools and Vouchers,
in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE, supra note 84, at 208-09. States also pay the tuition for certain disabled students to attend private schools in order to discharge the state
duty, under both federal statute and state constitution, to educate them. See generally
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
171 Such requirements appear in education. clauses in the following states: Arkansas,
California, Colorado (which also requires that children in free schools be "educated gratuitously"), Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi (subject to the limitation "upon such conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe"), Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See state education clauses cited supra note 1. This enumeration
does not include requirements that schools be "free of sectarian control." Alaska requires
that schools be "open to all children of the state." ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. Indiana and
South Dakota require education be provided "without charge." IND. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
S.D. CONST. art. VIL § 1. Wyoming's provision is limited to "free elementary schools."
WYO. CONST. art. VIL § 1.
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form." 1 72 Beyond the floor that the state must provide every child with
some educational option that is free of charge, 173 these terms also resist
exclusively textual interpretation. 74 Like "public" and "common," they
identify continua, not binary relationships. Schools and school systems
are neither free nor not free, uniform nor not uniform. Rather, some
are more free, or less uniform, than others.
Is it obvious, for example, whether a "free" school may demand, as
many contemporary public schools do, that students provide at their
own expense textbooks, 175 necessary school supplies, 176 or ancillary
items like required uniforms? 177 What about payments required only of
members of cocurricular and extracurricular groups like choirs, math
leagues, and football teams, which are often expected, through fees,
donations, or solicitations, somehow to pay for necessary instruments,
equipment, and transportation? 7 8 Can schools similarly require students to cover their own lab expenses in order to enroll in advanced
placement or other courses not required for graduation? 79 Or consider
the practices of many private and public schools of aggressively encouraging donations from parents and student-run sales campaigns hawking magazines and similar goods.18s It seems a cramped interpretation
indeed to regard all of these payments, which range over a spectrum
from mandatory to voluntary, and from large to small, as a violation of
the "freeness" requirement; but some people might reasonably object
to any of these payments on that basis.
172 The states are Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See state education
clauses cited supra note 1.
173 The nineteenth-century practice of running "a free 'public' school on funds from
the state ... until the cash ran out, then charg[ing] the parents tuition if they wanted their
children to continue" seems straightforwardly unconstitutional. See TYACK ET AL., supra
note 154, at 73.
174 But see HollyJ. Foster, School Fees in PublicEducation, 1993 BYU EDUC. & LJ. 149, 158
(noting commentators who argue that "the assertion that 'free' is textually ambiguous is
against the weight ofjudicial authority") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
175 Courts are divided on this question. See, e.g., Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 38-39
(Cal. 1984) (collecting and discussing cases); Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 467
S.E.2d 150, 155 (W. Va. 1995); Foster, supra note 174, at 157, 159-61 (collecting and dis-

cussing cases).
176 See Foster, supra note 174, at 157 n.62.
177 See Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (N.C. 1980).
178 See Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 38 (forbidding charges for curricular or extracurricular ac-

tivity); supra note 175.
179 See Granger v. Cascade County Sch. Dist. 499 P.2d 780, 785-86 (Mont. 1972) (cited
and discussed in Hartzel4 679 P.2d at 39 n.6).
180 See Levin, supra note 76, at 6.
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Similar questions can be raised about the requirement in a dozen
states that schools be "uniform,"18 1 a requirement with both substantive
and structural implications. Generally, "uniform" has similar implications, and raises similar complexities, as "equal." 8 2 A uniform system
must, in some sense, treat students alike. But this cannot mean that it
must expose each child to identical curricula, experiences, and opportunities.183 Indeed, the progressive-era pedagogy that followed the heyday of common schooling would make most educators consider doing
so to be egregious educational malpractice. Extracurricular activities,
elective, courses, tracking students by ability and preferences, and accommodating student disabilities and giftedness all involve differentiating the school program)

84

Different schools offer different packages of

services to meet the needs of the local labor market,185 to appeal to
students' diverse interests, 186 and to ameliorate racial, 187 gender, 188 and
class discrimination. 189 Externally, states and systems' ability to offer a
uniform program is affected by variations across communities and labor markets in population density, distribution of pupils across the age
spectrum, geographic economic stratification, and teacher supply. Finally, in any school with more than one teacher, irreducible variation in
teacher quality and student needs means that two students in the same
program will often have very different experiences. 190 All of these are
sources of nonuniformity; depending on one's perspective, some subset
of them is benign while others are malignant. 191
181See supra note 172.
182See McUsic, supra note 1, at 322-23; Ratner, supra note 104, at 814-16.

18 See Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting North Carolina's "uniformity" requirement not to require "identical opportunities" for all students) (cited in McUsic, supra note 1, at 321).
184 See THOMAS HALPER, PosrTVE RIGHTS IN A REPUBLIC OF TALK 165 (2003) (noting
that "a heterogeneous population plus substantial local control guarantees a proliferation
of disparities"); McConnell, supra note 149, at 131-32.
18 See, e.g., Sean Cavanagh, Vocational Education's New Job: Defend Thyself, EDUC. WK.,

Feb. 23, 2005, at 28.
186 See Archbald, supra note 75, at 283 (describing magnet programs).
187See id.
188See ROSEMARY SALAMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL 8 (2003).
189 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 84, at 24.

190 See Robert Gordon, ThomasJ. Kane & Douglas 0. Staiger, Identifying Effective Teachers
Using Performance on the Job 7 (Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2006-1,
2006), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/views/papers/200604hamilton-I.pdf (noting
that "effectiveness varies substantially among certified teachers and also among uncertified
teachers").
191 See HALPER, supra note 184, at 165 (noting that "it seems odd.., that only a system

pursuing uniformity would not be violative of student rights").
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In short, historical and textual analyses of the education clauses
leave most important questions regarding the constitutionality of
choice unanswered. They do not offer convincing ways to draw livoes
through the multidimensional spectrum of publicness and privaten' ;s.
At one end is the traditional district school whose Parent-Teacher As ociation does no fundraising, which is certainly a "public" school. At tihe
other is a religious school that refuses all government money and subsists entirely upon tuition and private fundraising, which is certainly a
private one. But between these extremes lie numerous other kinds of
schools, including many traditional public and private schools as well as
magnets, charters, and voucher-accepting private institutions.
C. What Is "Public"AboutPublic Schools?
A state school system should be deemed to meet the requirement to
support "public" or "common" schools if it fulfills the overarching goals
of those requirements. 192 Such a purpose-oriented approach is consistent
with state education-clause jurisprudence. State courts have routinely
understood "thorough," "efficient," and other substantive requirements
of the education clauses in terms of their purpose-to require educational equality or adequacy 9 3-notwithstanding that this is not a straightforward reading of the terms' dictionary definitions.19 4 State courts reason that terms like "thorough" and "efficient" imply, even if they do not
denote, some floor of quality (or equality).195 Moreover, purposive meaning can trump literal meaning: programs plausibly connected to enhancing school quality that have features not technically "efficient" 196 or
192Cf.Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 415-16 (Bell, J., dissenting) (explaining that requirement
to establish a "uniform ...system of free public schools" is secondary to the "core value"
expressed by the requirement that the state make "adequate provision for the education of
all children residing in its borders").
193See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13 (explaining that "efficient" means "equal educational opportunities" and "adequate" education); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office
of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Mass. 1993) (describing constitutional "duty... to cherish
the interests of literature and the sciences"); see also MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (defining an obligation to assure equality of educational opportunity); Abbott 17, 575 A.2d at 398
("thorough and efficient" means adequacy as well as curricular breadth); Matt Brooker,
Comment, Riding the Third Wave of School FinanceLitigation, 75 U. Mo. KAN. Crrv L. REv.
183, 208 (2006) (listing similar cases).
194See Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 4, at 572-77 (describing equity
and adequacy theories).
15 See id.
9
1 6 A gold-plated budget that produces high quality at enormous expense is manifestly
inefficient, but, distributional consequences aside, constitutional. This is a popular policy.
See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 769 (stating that 'wealthy school districts have long been
partaking of a luxury spending spree").
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"thorough"197 might be ill-advised, but are generally not, and should
not be, regarded as unconstitutional. Similarly, a range of charges, admissions restrictions, and policy variations can be accepted as constitutional even if there are ways in which they make schools less than literally "free," "public," or "uniform."
What is the purpose or policy behind the "public" requirement
for schools? Many scholars suggest that "public" or "common" schools
should advance the public or common good, i.e., that they must seek
public betterment rather than purely profit-maximizing or sectarian
agendas.1 98 But what counts as public betterment?199 Why should any
given answer to that question, rather than a competing one, be identified with the constitutional term "public"? Is there any way to define
public purposes without circularity or reliance on bare assertion?
Moreover, as Stephen Macedo notes, "Even where the answers seem
clear, public aims will be open to interpretation and implementation
2 00
by organizations that do not at base represent public purposes."
Furthermore, schools fulfill multiple missions: a school can simultaneously teach pluralism and advance religion, or promote literacy and
seek profits. How much public purpose renders the school public?

197 A decision to focus early elementary education nearly entirely upon the core skills
of reading, writing, and mathematics, to the derogation of science, history, and the arts is a
policy of dubious wisdom; but given that core competencies are gateways to all other learning, such a decision is reasonable and therefore constitutional, even though arguably not
"thorough." See Kathleen Manzo, Schools Urged to Push Beyond Math, Reading to Broader Curriculum, EDUC. WK., Dec. 20, 2006, at 11. Contra Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 398 ("However desperately a child may need remediation in basic skills, he or she also needs at least a modicum of variety and a chance to excel.").
198 See Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDoZo L. REv. 1281, 1311-13 (2002) (arguing that
school choice promotes the "common good" by facilitating the fulfillment of individuals,
families, and groups); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1236 (2003) (noting that "public values, which themselves require public deliberation, should guide assessments of the specific benefits and
limitations of competition and the quality of services delivered by for-profit or religious
providers in partnership with government to meet basic human needs"); id. at 1266 (noting that "a public framework of accountability.., should preserve and revitalize the conception of "public" that puts people at the center, for it is the people whom the government is supposed to serve"); Vergari, supra note 78, at 1.
199 See Garnett, supra note 198, at 1311 (citing the common good as "easy... too easy,
perhaps. What is the 'common good'? Is it just a cliche? How is its pursuit distinguishable
from the homogenizing aims of the common-school movement and the secularizing ambitions of its contemporary theoretical descendants?").
200 STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: Civic EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL

DEMOcRACY 273 (2000); see also Stephen Macedo, ConstitutingCivil Society, 75 CHI.-

KENT L. REv. 417, 430-32 (2000).
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The school choice debate has generally elicited two categories of
answers to these questions. Some are institutionalist,focusing on how
schools are organized, while others are instrumentalist,examining how
well schools produce desired outcomes. 20 1 The latter approach has
been strongly associated with school choice advocacy since Milton
Friedman jumpstarted the choice movement with his argument that
vouchers permit the efficiencies associated with competitive markets
to benefit education. 20 2 For Friedman and those who followed him,
the school voucher is a straightforward application of first-year college
economics to ameliorating poor school quality.203 Monopolies help

monopolists but hurt consumers; competitive markets, on the other
hand, harness consumer sovereignty to improve products for everyone-and particularly the poor, who in most voucher programs enjoy
priority in receiving rationed voucher payments. 20 4 The result of
20 5
vouchers would be a better and more cheaply schooled populace.
Post-Friedman, the theoretical account has been strengthened,
adapted, developed, and challenged in various ways. Scholars have
shown that the strong assumptions of the competitive market need not
hold perfectly to realize potential gains that Friedman and those who
came after him associated with competition, and that choice programs
can be designed to better approximate those assumptions. 20 6 John
Chubb and Terry Moe decisively altered the frame of the debate by
making a political-economy argument that identifies an irreducible
mismatch between the incentives of publicly controlled bureaucracies
and educationally sound institutions. 2 0 7 The universe of potential bene-

203

Lubienski, InstrumentalistPerspectives, supra note 167, at 488-89.
supra note 30, at 85-98.
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 149, at 121.

204

See

201

202 FRIEDMAN,

DWYER,

supra note 45, at 4-5. But see UTAH

CODE ANN.

§§ 53A-la-801 to -811

(2007) (making vouchers available to all Utah public-school students, although voucher
amounts are higher for the poor); Michele McNeil, Utah's Broad Voucher Plan Would Break
New Ground, EDUC. WK., Feb. 14, 2007, at 1, 22 (stating that lack of means-testing makes
Utah program unique).
205 FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 93-94.
206 See, e.g., Julian R. Betts, The Economic Theory of School Choice, in GETTING CHOICE
RIGHT: ENSURING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION POLICY 14, 22-36 (Julian R.
Betts & Tom Loveless eds., 2005); Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider, Shoppingfor Schools: How
Do Marginal Consumers Gather Information About Schools?, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 121, 125-26
(2003) (arguing that only a small number of "marginal consumer" parents must undertake
rational information-gathering and search for choice mechanisms to operate fairly well).
But see SCOTT FRANKLIN ABERNATHY, SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5-6 (2005) (arguing that the exercise of choice by informed, marginal parents
harms students of inframarginal parents).
207 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 84, at 188.
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fits has been expanded beyond quality: a recent collection neatly identifies the basket of benefits theoretically associated with choice when its
subtitle asks, "Can the Marketplace Deliver Choice, Efficiency, Equity,
and Social Cohesion?"2 08 Finally, numerous scholars have developed
2 9
strong instrumentalist objections to choice programs.
The education clauses, however, do not permit a completely instrumentalist justification for choice. As I argue above, requirements
that schools be "public" or "common" are supplementary to substantive requirements like adequacy.210 Choice therefore requires institu21
tionalist justifications, in addition to instrumentalist ones. '
Just as instrumentalism is associated with prochoice views, although there are antichoice instrumentalists, the most prominent institutionalist position, what James Dwyer describes as the "liberal statist
view,"2 12 is skeptical of choice. Although there is variance among statists' positions with respect to how much parental choice is tolerable or
desirable, they share the view that the "public good" that "public
schools" promote flows from the collective, democratic provision of
education by local polities. Decision making by the polity is thought of
as distinct from, and superior to, decision making by individual families
in a market. Statists emphasize that "public" should be understood as
the opposite of "private," or of what you get when you "privatize"
schools 213 -even as they readily acknowledge that "privatize" is itself a
208 Levin, supra note 76; accord Clive Belfield & Henry Levin, Vouchers and PublicPolicy,
111 Am. J. EDUC. 548, 551-52 (2005). Particular note must be taken of the inclusion of
"choice" as a potential benefit of choice programs, that is, as a good in itself, rather than as
purely a means to other ends. This view arises fairly late in contemporary choice advocacy,
but to economists at least makes perfect sense: consumers with multiple options are never
worse off, and often better off, than those with only one of those options, all else equal.
209 See, e.g., Heise, supra note 103, at 436-39 (summarizing the debate). Those who elevate equity above other goals as the single critical feature of democratic education have
been particularly chary about choice programs, fearing their impact on those "left behind"
in public schools. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Equity and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE:
THE MORAL DEBATE, supra note 84, at 59. An increasingly prominent group of scholars,
however, has argued recently that choice might promote equity relative to a system of educational localism. See scholars cited supra note 84.
210 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
211 See Lubienski, InstrumentalistPerspectives, supra note 167, at 488-89.
212 James G. Dwyer, Changing the Conversation about Children's Education, in NoMos
XLIII: MORAL & POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 149, at 314, 316.
213 See ABERNATHY, supra note 206, at 6, 18 (objecting to choice programs that include
"private sector" schools as enabling a "privatization of voice" that "chang [es] the dynamics
of institutional control ... and restrict[s citizens'] own understandings of political obligations"); Metzger, supra note 76, at 1392 ("Interestingly, however, parental choice also
represents yet a further way in which these measures privatize public education; decisions
about educational content and quality become a personal rather than collective responsi-
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multivalent term. 214 Similarly, recognizing that education is both a local

"public good" and a private good, the statists insist that its public-good

aspect deserves priority.215 Thus Christopher Lubienski's institutionalist
account emphasizes that public goods are associated with public man-

agement for good reasons: "Marketized environments," he argues,

"create disincentives for providers to shoulder costs associated with pursuing public goals such as desegregation, mainstreaming, cultural diversity, or other goals that society may expect from its schools."216
Another view, however, understands "public" in a pluralist rather
than statist fashion, while remaining thoroughly institutionalist in outlook. Judge Michael McConnell, in his classic statement of this position,
notes that if "common values" were truly common they will be taught
by all schools, public and private; it is only because there is no consensus about what values are "common" that statists are concerned that
common schools should reflect common values. 217 McConnell concludes that a society both liberal and pluralist advances those goals better by facilitating, rather than impeding, school choice in a pluralist
marketplace. 218 Such arguments, unlike the statists', rely little upon the
words "public" and "common";219 McConnell, for example, instead
stresses the concepts of liberalism, pluralism, and democracy.220 This
does not mean, however, that McConnell and others of similar views are
bility, thereby creating schools that, in essence, are private communities of like-minded
families."); Minow, supra note 198, at 1230 ("The new versions of privatization potentially
jeopardize public purposes by pressing for market-style competition, by sidestepping
norms that apply to public programs, and by eradicating the public identity of social efforts to meet human needs.").
214 See Claude Chitty, Privatisation and Marketisation, 23 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 45, 45
(1997); Lubienski, supra note 34, at 3-4, 14-15 (identifying private funding and private
governance as the two primary axes of privatization reforms and noting interestingly that
most school choice reforms privatize primarily along the latter axis while increasing public
funding of privately governed schools).
215 See Lubienski, Instrumentalist Perspectives, supra note 167, at 499. But see Herbert
Gintis, The PoliticalEconomy of School Choice, 96 TCHRS. C. REC. 492, 494 (1995) (stating that
public/private goods distinction is "specious" in educational context).
216 See Lubienski, InstrumentalistPerspectives, supra note 167, at 497.
217 McConnell, supra note 149, at 106. Others take the libertarian view that choice is an
institutionalist good in itself. See David Hargreaves, Diversity and Choice in School Education,
22 OXFORD REv. EDUC. 131, 133 (1996).
218 See McConnell, supra note 149, at 120-21.
219 See Lubienski, supra note 74, at 467 (stating that "'market-based reform' ... in essence requires a reconfiguration of the idea of 'the public'"); cf.Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms Through Privatization,116 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1285 (2003) (stating that
.privatization can be a means of 'publicization,' through which private actors increasingly
commit themselves to traditionally public goals").
220 See McConnell, supra note 149, at 120-21.
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any less concerned than the statists with what public schools are and
how they help to realize the public, or common, good.
Statist and pluralist accounts offer deeply conflicting views of what
constitutes the critical institutional core of "publicness." Each will be
compelling to some and unpersuasive to others. There seems little justification, however, to insist that either is the only proper interpretation
of historically and textually ambiguous requirements to support "public
schools." Both approaches are legitimate, and state education clauses
are therefore best read to permit state legislatures to adopt either.
State elected officials who take a statist approach can constitutionally maintain the classical system of bureaucratic, localist "public"
schools where parents choose only where to live and whether to exit
the system in favor of private school. 221 There are very important
senses in which such a system is not "public," "common," or "free":
most notably, all students are not eligible to attend the same schools,
and eligibility is contingent on payments their families have made for
particular residential locations. 222 Nevertheless, the system reflects a
reasonable, statist understanding of what "public" schools ought to
be-provided by the local polity, common to all of its members, and
funded without parent-to-school payments.
In the balance of this Article, I argue that state elected officials
can also meet the requirement to support "public" or "common"
schooling by taking a pluralist approach and supporting vouchers and
charters along with more traditional sorts of schools. This does not
mean, however, that every voucher or charter system meets the requirement of publicness. A pluralist conception of the public good
and of the public school implies limitations on the range of choice
223
programs that are permissible. Part ll describes these limitations.
HI.

RECONCILING CHOICE AND THE CLAUSES

This Part argues that school choice should be viewed as consistent with education clauses if they meet two criteria. 224 First, choice
programs must be reasonably expected to result in education of adequate quality. Second, the choice programs must provide, so long as
221 See

supra notes 29-72 and accompanying text.
GLENN, supra note 143, at 261 (stating that the myth of common school "has
persisted with undiminished force into the twentieth [century], despite all evidence that
public schools are in no sense 'common'"); Dimond, supra note 72, at 324.
223 See infra notes 224-350 and accompanying text.
224 See infra notes 224-350 and accompanying text.
222

See

20071

School Choice & States' Duty to Support "Public"Schools

not inconsistent with the first criterion, parents with a genuine and independent choice among educational providers.
The first half of the proposed test-a reasonable connection to
improving educational quality-is intended to be one that can easily
be met by most choice and privatization proposals. Well-developed
theoretical arguments support the view that choice and privatization
have the potential to improve educational quality, although empirical
demonstrations of such benefits are contested and far from robust.
The rule is designed so that serious theoretical potential, absent both
empirical disproof and a satisfactory status quo, suffices.
In contrast, the second part of the test-that choice, if provided,
be genuine and independent-does limit the design of choice. It borrows from the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 holding in Zelman v. Simmons-Harristhat, under the Federal Establishment Clause, private individuals may direct state-provided voucher funds to religious and
secular schools, so long as their choice to do so is "genuine and independent."225 The test proposed here similarly requires that choice
programs multiply, rather than frustrate, the ability of parents to exercise choice in the educational marketplace.
The following Sections elaborate and justify both parts of this
proposal. The first Section discusses the Zelman case and explains why
its "genuine and independent choice" test, developed in the context
of the Federal Establishment Clause, has useful application in the very
different area of state educational rights. 226 The first Section also discusses how criteria of genuineness and independence should be applied. 227 A second Section then discusses the less constraining, but
critical, requirement that choice be reasonably thought to advance
228
educational quality.
A. Genuine and Independent Choice
1. Choice and Markets in Zelman
Zelman holds that a voucher program is constitutional under the
Federal Establishment Clause so long as parents exercise "true private

225 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002); accord id. at 662 (basing a judgment of constitutionality
upon the conclusion that the Cleveland program offers parents "genuine choice" and
"true private choice").
226 See infra notes 229-316 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 276-301 and accompanying text.
228 See infra notes 317-350 and accompanying text.
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choice," 22 which it defines as a system in which "government aid
reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals. "23° Zelman notably does not extend
blanket sanction to all programs of "choice"; choice must be "genuine
and independent."2 1 So, for example, the Court would presumably
have rejected a voucher program that allowed parents to choose between free attendance at a public school "among the worst performing
... in the Nation" 23 2 and free attendance, by means of a state-funded
voucher, in a single, academically top-notch but pervasively sectarian
private academy. This is no "genuine and independent" choice between
religious and irreligious education: there are only two options, and only
one-the religious one--offers academic quality. In drawing a line at
"true," "genuine," and "independent" choice, on the other hand, the
Court also avoids requiring states to provide every imaginable choice to
every imaginable consumer in order to pass constitutional muster. A
menu of sufficient choices, generated by the market created by paren233
tal choice, suffices.
Why incorporate Zelman's holding into the analysis of the education clauses? Although it is obviously desirable from the point of view
of those who might establish school choice programs that two separate constitutional mandates could be satisfied by the application of a
single rule, this is scarcely a sufficient reason to import the rule of
Zelman into the education-rights area. The Establishment Clause and
education clauses guarantee different rights, different kinds of rights,
and appear in different varieties of constitutions.
In the school choice debate, both in the courts and the broader
policy community, this chasm looms large. All but one of the Supreme
Court's six Zelman opinions endorse, explicitly or implicitly, Justice Stevens's admonition that educational inadequacy in Cleveland "is not a
matter that should affect our appraisal of [vouchers'] constitutionality."234 Policy and legal commentators across the ideological spectrum
229

536 U.S. at 653, 662.

230 Id. at 649; cf. id. at 662 (Ohio program permits parents to exercise "genuine

choice").
231 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REv.
1397, 1398 (2003) (arguing that "Zelman... does not bless all forms of public-private partnerships").
232 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
233 Regarding what is sufficient, see supra notes 276-301.
234 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684 (StevensJ., dissenting). The majority approves the program
after finding it to be consistent with the Court's earlier cases on church/state separation.
Id. at 653 (majority opinion). For the Zelman dissenters, vouchers intolerably breach the
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often follow Stevens' lead: they treat choice primarily as a church-state
question, 35 even though they do not share the Justices' duty to confine
themselves to federal questions properly before them. Others, who approach choice as a regulatory route to good schools (however defined),
find this infuriating. They regard those consumed with Establishment
questions as at best quixotically elevating hypothetical religious conflicts over the grim actuality of educational failure,2 36 and at worst as
obfuscating their true political goal of (depending on which side they
are on) protecting the insidious public school monopoly or preventing
it from being sucked dry by self-serving privateers.2 3 7 In this camp is
Justice Thomas, whose outlier opinion in Zelman indignantly condemns

church/state barrier and, for three of the four dissenting Justices, are a potential harbinger of Sarajevo-style "religious strife." Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord id. at 717
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, but not Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the latter
dissents.
25 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 231-32, 244-48 (2005); Ira Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A WideAngle Look at Government Vouchers and Secarian Service Prviders, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 543-48 (2002) (cataloguing various possible approaches to vouchers
under the Establishment Clause); Minow, supra note 198, at 1232-33 (framing the choice
debate as a church/state question, although mentioning other issues). Other commentators
analyze religion and educational quality in tandem. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, DtvERsrrY IN
AMERICA 297-307 (2003). See generaly DWYER,'supra note 45; McConnell, supra note 149.
236 See HoxBy, supra note 73, at xi ("For a long time, I have thought that the churchstate issue in school choice debates was a red herring.").
237 See DWYER, supra note 45, at 5 (noting that "there is every reason to suspect that the
principal advocates for vouchers have an ulterior motive"); Charles Fried, Five to Four,116
HARV. L. REv. 163, 172-73 (2002); Frank Macchiarola, Why the Decision in Zelman Makes So
Much Sense, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 459, 462 (2003).
I take no side in this debate here. The choice-as-reform camp is right that the possibility of a hypothetical Christian school using public funds to teach young children particularistic doctrine appears to upset people like Justices Souter and Breyer more than the
actual fact of Cleveland's public schools using public funds in ways that leave their students
unable to read. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713 & n.24 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 724
(Breyer, J., dissenting). At the same time, voucher proponents generally have not chosen
to limit vouchers to secular private schools, nor has voucher advocacy receded in the face
of other approaches to school choice, such as charters, that restrict choice to secular institutions. See KEvtN B. SMITH, THE IDEOLOGY OF EDUCATION 98-99 (2003) (stating that private religious and public schools mostly share academic goals, but differ primarily in religious pedagogy). But see CLINT BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS 46-47 (2003) (claiming that
inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee "was not a
matter of desiring a religious influence, but rather of providing as many alternatives as
possible" so that choice would be "meaningful"). All the debates' interlocutors are aware,
moreover, that schools are not only full of impressionable children, but take as their explicit mission to shape the minds of those children-and thus the civic culture of the next
generation. See HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 61 (2000); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REv. 967,
993-96 (2003); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235, at 596.
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the focus of both his concurring and dissenting colleagues. 238 The students of Cleveland are suffering at the hands of its public-school monopolists, Thomas writes; how can one parse church-state questions
when vouchers offer inner-city, mostly black Cleveland students a way,
23 9
perhaps the only way, out of the quicksand of education dysfunction?
He is amazed, in the face of this need, that "[o]pponents of the program"- "the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers"-are still prepared to
"raise formalistic concerns about the Establishment Clause.- 240
Nevertheless, I argue, Zelman offers an approach to the market for
schooling that usefully informs education-rights as well as Establishment analysis. This is because the Court in Zelman understood the
Cleveland voucher program as an effort by the State of Ohio to catalyze
a pluralist market for schooling, rather than as an effort to subsidize
241
individuals' static preferences for religious education.
The extent of this departure has not been widely recognized. Zelman is generally categorized as an "aid" or "funding" case, along with
such other Supreme Court cases as Mitchell v. Helms,242 Agostini v. Felton,243 Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School Distrid,244 Witters v. Wisconsin Department of Services for the Blind,245 and Mueller v. Allen,246 because it involves government spending in aid of religious schools. 247 Zelman

presents its own holding as a straight line extrapolation of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest.248 Indeed, the phrase "genuine and independent
choice" is not a new coinage but taken directly from Mitchell 249 and
250
Agostini.

238 536 U.S. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
239

Id.

240 Id. at

682.

See generally id.(majority opinion).
242 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
243 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
241

244 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
245 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
246 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
247 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 367 (2001); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the
Doctnine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1855 (2004); GaryJ. Simeson, School Vouchers and the Constitution, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 553, 574-75 (2002);
Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 5-8.
248 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-52.
249 530 U.S. at 810.
250 See 521 U.S. at 226; see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (holding statute constitutional because funds arrive at religious schools only due to "private decision [s] of individual par-

ents").
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In the earlier K-12 aid cases, however, government subsidies were
conceptualized as efforts to cushion the pain associated with a decision to pay tuition to private schools when public schooling could be
had for free. 25' Theoretically, there can be no doubt that a tax credit
like that upheld in Mueller,252 or tuition savings like that generated by
the in-kind aid upheld in Mitchell and Agostini,253 will, by changing the
effective price of religious relative to public schools, result in some
marginal parent-consumer changing her preference between the two.
Nevertheless, until Zelman, the marginal case is absent from the
Court's opinions. Indeed, the Court repeatedly dismisses the possibil2 54
ity that preferences might respond to changes in effective prices.

Rather, the cases focus on the inframarginal consumers, those already
251 The exception is Witters. See 474 U.S. at 483. Unlike Mitchell and Agostini, but like
Zelman, the program challenged in Witters-vocational assistance for college studentsseems clearly intended to catalyze college attendance for students, not just to assist those
who had chosen college already. Still, Witters, like Mitchell and Agostini, treats the availability
of vocational aid as if it does not affect the prospective choices of potential recipients.
Thus, in applying the Lemon test, Witters asks whether the aid is a permissible "transfer" or
.subsidy," but not whether it is a permissible incentive. See id. at 485, 487. Moreover, Witters
emphasizes that there is "nothing in the record" to suggest that "any significant portion of
the aid ... will end up flowing to religious education" -precisely the opposite of the situation in Zelman. Id. at 752. This was true in part because Witters is a higher education case,
so aid recipients were choosing not only a particular school but whether to purchase
schooling at all.
252 See 463 U.S. at 399 ("It is true, of course, that financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to the
schools attended by their children."); see also ScHucK, supra note 235, at 299 (noting that
tax credits are a form of voucher). In recent years there has been new interest in the tax
credit approach. See supra note 8.
253 See Mitchell 530 U.S. at 814; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228. So long as the elasticity of demand for private education is nonzero, schools will pass part of value the of the in-kind
subsidy they receive to parents in the form of lower tuition.
254 See, e.g., Mitchell 530 U.S. at 814 (plurality opinion) ("[S]imply because an aid program offers ... religious schools a benefit that they did not previously receive does not
mean that the program, by reducing the cost of securing a religious education, creates ...
an 'incentive' for parents to choose such an education for their children."). By saying it, of
course, Justice Thomas does not make it so, as Mitchell promptly acknowledges in arguing
this sort of "benefit" is not of the kind that should disqualify a neutrally administered program. See id. ("For any aid will have some such effect."). Similarly, Agostini argues that because the Tide I services provided to parochial schools under the challenged legislation
.are by law supplemental to the regular curricula," they "do not, therefore, relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their students." 521 U.S.
at 228. Even demurring to the Court's unlikely confidence that parochial schools, absent
Tide I support, would make no attempt to provide any similar services using their own
resources, compare id. at 229 (predicting such attempts "rest[s] on speculation") with id. at
244 (Souter, J., dissenting) (predicting such attempts), on-site remedial education still
provides parochial school parents with a more attractive package of educational services, at
the same price, than they would have absent the program.
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choosing religious school. Pre-Zelman choice matters only because
private citizens make choices freely, uncoerced by government; the
question is whether government, accepting the legitimacy of their
choices, may help alleviate the costs private citizens have chosen to
bear.255 Therefore, the Rehnquist Court's aid cases are full of talk
about choice, but until Zelman no talk about markets.
The raison d'itre of a voucher program, by contrast, is to catalyze
choices different than those parents were previously making. Indeed, the
possibility that vouchers might simply subsidize parents already using
private schools, leading to no change in enrollment patterns, is often
viewed as a flaw of such programs.2 56 The innovation of Zelman, therefore, was to recast the Court's "genuine and independent choice" rule,
developed to permit government subsidies because they would not influence private choices, to apply to programs in which the state sought,
specifically and explicitly, to influence those choices. 257 But that influence was to be of a particular kind: the state would extend the range of
choice by creating markets, including markets that embraced religious
258
sellers, to replace government monopoly.
Although this move is not implied by Mueler, Agostini, or Zobrest,
it is a justifiable innovation. 259 It rests on an understanding of markets
as a device for aggregating and fulfilling private preferences that differs fundamentally from democratic decision making. In the latter,
the aggregation of private preferences is the "public" will, and the
255 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (explaining that by providing Title I services in all
schools, the program does not "give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious
beliefs or practices in order to obtain these services"); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395 (stating that
tuition tax credit reflects a "State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses
incurred by parents"); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235, at 559 (describing interlocutors in the pre-Zelman voucher debate as all "describ[ing] the set of relationships involved
in voucher programs as a straight line running from government to recipients and then to
service providers").
256 See BOLICK, supra note 237, at 74-75 (reporting conflict in the design of the Cleve-

land voucher program over whether students already in private school should be voucher
eligible, and the decision that at least half of voucher recipients must be public school
students); McNeil, supra note 204, at 1, 24 (noting Utah voucher program excludes current private school enrollees).

See generally 536 U.S. 639.
Accord Paul E. Salamanca, Choice Programs and Market-BasedSeparationism,50 Burr. L.
REv. 931, 934 (2002) (arguing that Zelman embraces "'market-based separationism,'" under which "the government can subsidize some or all consumers in a market, without violating the Establishment Clause, if the supply in the market is sufficiently large and variegated to make choice the operative principle in uniting consumers with producers, if the
subsidy is formally neutral with regard to religious and nonreligious options, and if the
product at issue can be defined in strictly secular terms").
259 See generally Agostini, 521 U.S. 203; Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1; Mueller, 463 U.S. 388.
257
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clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that government
may not, in obedience to such public will, advance religion. The point
of Zelman is that a government that creates a market that includes religious institutions is doing something else: it is facilitating private
choices, in the aggregate, without imposing its own will or establishing
its own preferences. Zelman legitimates this kind of pluralist, public
support for religious preference-one that not only supports all
choices once made, but also actively seeks to make such choices more
available to more people-because with markets, government can
avoid putting its thumb on the scale regarding the content of individual choices.
That the Zelman Court, and particularly Justice O'Connor's swing
vote, 260 relies upon a view of educational markets as an unbiased device
for fulfilling preferences is best seen in an interchange between Justice
O'Connor and Justice Souter over the majority's application of its
"genuine and independent choice" criterion. Souter insists that choice
is truly "genuine" only if alternative schools are all of adequate quality.26 1 To Souter, therefore, the choice presented by Cleveland's charter

schools was illusory, because only a single charter posted test scores
even "arguabl[y]" close to those of traditional public schools and the
rest scored worse. 262 "I think," Souter writes, "that objective academic
excellence should be the benchmark in comparing schools."263
O'Connor, by contrast, conceptualizes parents as homo economicus. the
bare fact that parents are choosing those charter schools indicates that
the charter schools are better for them. 264 Souter is wrong, she argues, to
"assum[e] that the only relevant measure of school quality is academic
performance. It is reasonable to suppose ... that parents in the inner
city also choose schools that provide discipline and a safe environment
265
for their children."
Justice Souter must admit, I think, that it is reasonable: academic
quality and religious approach are but two of the many legitimate criteria parents might use to choose among schools. 266 Souter surely
260 Professors Lupu and Tuttle conclude, based on a convincing analysis of the separate opinions in Zelman, that Justice O'Connor, now departed from the Court, "is the only
member of the Court who thinks that 'genuine and independent choice' has determinative constitutional significance." Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 11, at 943-44.
261 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 702 n.10 (SouterJ., dissenting).
262
263
264
265

Id.
Id.

See id. at 675 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.

266 See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
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cannot mean that every package of relevant factors available in any
religious. school must be matched by an identical package in a secular
school. Souter's rejoinder, therefore, is that O'Connor's position is
vacuous: it treats any choice once made as "genuine and independent" merely because it has been made, because one option has been
selected over another. 267 But O'Connor clearly does not think that, or
she would have felt no need to dwell on Cleveland parents' access to
community schools. 268 Instead, she thinks that the choices that do ex-

ist must be broad and numerous enough to satisfy the "genuine and
independent" criterion.
What is enough? O'Connor's insistence that any number of legitimate preferences might lead parents to prefer one school over another
offers a clue to a workable answer-one that relies upon an ordinary
understanding of choice in consumer markets. On that view, consumers have "choice" even when limited by the range of goods available on
the market and, especially, by their own resources. First-time homebuyers exercise "genuine and independent" choice regarding which house
they will buy, even though a few iconoclastic aesthetes among them
cannot find homes to their tastes in the neighborhoods where they
want to live, even though some people must rent because they are too
poor to buy at all, and even though most everyone who can afford a
house cannot buy the kind of house that they wish they could afford.
Nevertheless, at some point housing market failures could become severe enough that homebuyers would not be viewed as exercising "genu269
ine and independent" choice.
But schooling, as Part I explains, is not an ordinary consumer
good, nor is it bought and sold in an ordinary consumer market.
Compulsory schooling prevents substitution among goods, and prices
cannot function normally.2 70 Choice programs complicate market
regulation further; for example, the Ohio statute upheld in Zelman
267Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703 (Souter,J., dissenting).
2f1 Id. at 672-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 663 (arguing that it is necessary to "elaborate on the Court's conclusion that [its] inquiry should consider all reasonable educational alternatives that are available to parents," Le., the choices that parents
actually have, because "[t]o do otherwise is to ignore how the educational system in Cleveland actually functions").
269Some poor people, absent adequate government subsidy, lack any real choice in the
housing market. See Michael E. Stone, Housing Affordability, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING 38,
47-49 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006); cf Haw. Hods. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232,
241 (1984) (stating that domination of Hawaii housing market by fewer than two dozen
landowners is a "market failure").
270 See supra notes 33-34.
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provided vouchers preferentially to poor families, required a parental
copayment of ten percent, and capped total tuition, from all sources,
at $2500.271 With both consumer sovereignty and the price mecha-

nism so severely curtailed, what does it mean to have "genuine and
independent choice" like that one would see in an ordinary market?
It means, as I think O'Connor's approach to the academic-quality
question suggests, that educational choice should be designed to mimic
a free market to the extent possible, given the other constitutional rules
that constrain it. Therefore, as in any consumer market, the options
that parents face may be limited, even severely so. The rich can enjoy
more and better choices than the poor, and high achievers more and
better choices than low achievers.2 72 The state need not guarantee all
consumers access to the highest quality goods at artificially low prices.
But the menu of options must be substantial, not illusory.273 More im-

portantly, unnecessary, governmentally-imposed obstacles to market
entry and matching of parents with schools must be avoided, because it
is only by avoiding these mechanisms that the menu of available options can be relied upon to reflect the preferences of consumers rather
274
than governmental fiat.
Zelman ratifies the virtues of market mechanisms precisely because
markets satisfy individually determined, not democratically aggregated,
preferences. But that government can expand choice without biasing it
does not mean that government will. Zelman therefore imposes the
principle that choice must be "genuine and independent" so that government cannot use its regulatory powers to impose its own point of
view and in that way bias choices that would otherwise be freely
made. 275 If government jiggers an ostensibly pluralist market so that it
271 536 U.S. at 646.

272 See Ruth Curran Neild, ParentManagement of School Choice in a Large Urban District,40
UIR. EDuc. 270, 294 (2005) (stating that "schools that select based on students' previous
academic performance do some choosing of their own," so that school choice does not
allow "parents ... to choose schools much the way one chooses a long-distance telephone
company").
273 See Gintis, supra note 215, at 497.
274 See Joseph L. Bast & Herbert J. Walberg, Can Parents Choose the Best Schools for Their
Children , 34 EcoN. EDUC. REv. 431, 433 (2004) ("If schooling were provided in a competitive market, we would expect to see greater diversity... as entrepreneurs tailor the traditional school and classroom to meet the interests and needs of parents and students.");
Bryan Hassel, The Future of CharterSchools, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE 187, 188-89
(Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003) (noting that both voucher and charter schools arise "in response to the availability" of choice).
275 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235, at 558 ("[T]he question of forbidden effects in
voucher cases [under the Establishment Clause] is about the state's role in creating pressures and incentives towards religious experience in ways that make it more likely to be
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in fact favors particular schools or types of schools, private choice ceases
to drive the system and the risk of establishment becomes serious.
2. Some Applications
In their separate Zelman opinions, Justices O'Connor and Souter
disagree whether particular features of the school choice program
adopted for Cleveland render choice under that program not "genuine and independent." 276 I argue above that the test's critical requirement is that government-subsidized school choice not bias the
choices parents make in the educational quasi-market. On that basis,
both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter are right about some aspects of the program.
O'Connor justifiably insists that the genuineness and independence of choice cannot be disproved either by the mix of schools that
the quasi-market provides or the schools that parents choose, absent
other evidence. 277 Moreover, in determining how closely a choice proundertaken than would have been the case in the absence of the voucher program."); id.
at 576 (stating that "the government.., must not intentionally skew the mix toward religious providers").
276 See 536 U.S. at 695-96 (Souter, J., dissenting). Elsewhere Justice Souter argues that
the test itself is improper. Id. at 688-95.
277 Compare id. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "no voucher student has
been known to be turned away from a nonreligious private school participating in the
voucher program," which is "impressive given evidence" that parents have "reasonable
nonreligious options"), with id. at 699, 701 (SouterJ., dissenting) (noting that "genuine"
choice between religious and secular options requires there to be "enough secular private
school desks in relation to the number of religious ones"). Souter refuses to acknowledge,
moreover, that although parents whose own particular religious commitments lead them
to desire religiously-based instruction are the core constituents of their own faiths' private
schools, religious schools also attract parents open to secular as well as religious, and publicly-funded as well as tuition-based, schooling options. Religious schools compete for these
parents with nonreligious schools, public and private both, on a range of attributes, including pedagogical approach, discipline, values, quality of instruction, and price. Parents
purchasing such schooling for their children will sometimes regard the direct religious
instruction they provide as a benefit, and sometimes as a cost for which other features of
the school compensate. See HoxBv, supra note 73, at 9-11; Sarah Garland, Church Schools
Face Challengefrom Charters,N.Y. SUN, Feb. 27, 2007, at 1 (Catholic school principal predicting that greater charter access will decrease her enrollments, noting, "If you had an opportunity to get your child into a school modeled on Catholic education, and it's free, of
course you're going to do it"). Some religious schools may view serving this population, in
addition to its core constituency of the faithful, as part of their religious and educational
mission. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights
Supporting Petitioners, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 001777, 00-1779), at 11-12 [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (explaining that Catholic schools do
not seek to indoctrinate students with Catholic doctrine but to "nurtur[e] the intellectual
faculties").
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gram approximates market choice, O'Connor and the Court are clearly
right, and Souter clearly wrong, that the local availability of charter
schools, as well as the state of traditional public schools, is relevant. 278
Voucher use is optional, and the quasi-market in which parents decide
whether to exercise that option requires them to consider whether private school with voucher, private school without voucher, charter, or
traditional school best meets their needs. Because that is the choice
they face, that is the choice which must be "genuine and independent."279

Similarly, a market-based understanding of the test rejects Souter's
claim that schools with poor test scores are not realistic "choices" in favor of O'Connor's view that parents can have legitimate preferences
over a wide range of school characteristics. 28 Distance from home, for
example, has proven an important determinant of parental preferences.2 81 Other preferences ought not be disregarded either.28 2 One
278 Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 660 n.6 (all options relevant), and id. at 673-74
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (same), with id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that if
charter and traditional public schools count as "relevant choices," then the "genuine and
independent choice" criterion cannot function as a "limiting principle"). Conversely, it is
wrong to assert, as Professor Foley does, that one can demonstrate that choice is "genuine
and independent" merely because parents exercising choice experience their decisions as
freely made. See Edward Foley,Judging VoucherPrograms One at a Time, 27 U. DAYTON L. REv.
1, 6-7 (2001). Such perceptions are consistent with a government-manipulated market.
279 Accord Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235, at 594-95.
280 See supranotes 260-268 and accompanying text.
281 Academic quality is the dominant influence upon parents choosing among
schools--certainly if self-reporting is reliable, and likely even if not. See Bast & Walberg,
supra note 274, at 435-36 (reviewing literature); Kurt L. Tedin & Gregory R. Weiher, Racial/EthnicDiversity and Academic Quality as Components of School Choice, 66J. POL. 1109, 1111,
1130 (2004) (same). But distance from home trumps quality for some families. See, e.g.,
Justine S. Hastings et al., ParentalPreferences and School Competition: Evidence from a Public
School Choice Program 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 11805, 2005)
(finding a strong parental preference for schools close to home, controlling for the possibility of families' locating near preferred schools, while finding parental preferences for
high test scores that vary with income and the child's academic ability).
282 See MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., CHOOSING SCHOOLS 86-95 & fig.4.1 (reviewing literature in support of claim that schooling is a "multidimensional good," and listing eleven
factors parents "fid important" in schools); Bast & Walberg, supra note 274, at 433 (stating that different schools are "best" for different children); Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing
Money at Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19, 34 (1981) (asserting rationality of choosing schools for "pleasant surroundings, athletic facilities, [or] cultural advantages"); see
also, e.g., Eddie Denessen et al., Segregation by Choice? A Study of Group-Specific Reasons for
School Choice, 20J. EDUc. PoL'v 347, 350, 362-64 (2005) (concluding that academic quality
is a major determinant of parental school choices in the Netherlands, but that geographic
proximity, "order and discipline," and class and religious backgrounds also shape preferences); William G. Howell, Dynamic Selection Effects in Means-Tested, Urban School Voucher

Programs, 23 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 225, 242 (2004) (concluding that families' reli-
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need have no illusions about markets and the extent to which parents
are well informed about their options 283 to think that charter and private schools, which are founded entrepreneurially and survive only if
they can attract children, offer parents a choice at least as "genuine and
independent" as a menu of schools developed entirely by bureaucrats
working in hierarchical systems.
In other particulars, however, Souter's arguments are better than
O'Connor's. 284 Take Souter's suggestion that the low voucher amount,
along with the requirement that the voucher pay ninety percent of
total school charges, biases the range of schools willing to make themselves available to voucher-holding parents. 2 s 5 In the Establishment

Clause context, the problem with this is that the bias favors religious
schools that enjoy external sources of funding and/or can employ
staff at below-market wages. 286 In the education clause context, the

problem is more systematic. If any new school wishing to accept a
voucher must agree to hold its total per-student charges (voucher plus
tuition) below the amount that even the most cost-conscious school
requires to balance its budget, then the market-entry mechanism is
undermined. Although schools will still close in response to the market-schools cannot sustain themselves without attracting enough
students-few new schools will enter when entry is by definition a losing proposition. 28 7 Those that do enter will not shape their program
to satisfy the preferences among consumers but in line with whatever
gious beliefs affect their use of vouchers); Bretten Kleitz et al., Choice, CharterSchools, and
Household Preferences, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 846, 847 (2000) (reviewing prior literature raising
.serious questions... about the validity" of the claim that "all households seek the same
thing from schools-quality education"); Tedin & Weiher, supra note 281, at 1130-31
(2004) (analyzing relationship between preferences for school quality and diversity, and
noting also preferences for "teaching moral values").
283 See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 37-40; EMILY VAN DUNK & ANNELIESE M.
DICKMAN, SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE QUESTION OF AcCOUNTABILrrY 74-95 (2003); Gintis,

supra note 215, at 498-500; Neild, supra note 272.
284 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 705 (SouterJ., dissenting).
285 See id.
286 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 91 (parochial schools, absent public subsidy, enjoy

"the compensating advantage of being run by institutions that are willing to subsidize them
and can raise funds to do so"); GoDWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 16 (parochial schools
"often receive subsidies from their religious organizations [and] do not pay the market
value for teachers who are members of religious orders"); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235,
at 569; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 277, at 27 (Catholic schools accept vouchers at a
loss).
287 See Coons, supra note 83, at 602 (workable choice programs must offer a subsidy
"big enough to start new schools," one that "ought at least to exceed 80-90 percent of the
total average of what is currently being spent in state schools on the particular category of
child").
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noneconomic preferences have already made them willing to take a
loss. By severing the connection between what parents want and what
they are offered that ordinary market competition provides, a too-low
government-imposed cap on school charges renders parents' choices
not "genuine and independent."
This is not to say that the government may not cap school charges
or charter allocations at all, or must cap them at levels that exceed the
tuition of all but the most gold-plated of schools. Free markets need
not guarantee Cadillac-level service to all. Perhaps more importantly, a
cap on total charges restricts private schools' capacity to capture subsidies for themselves by raising tuition when demand is inelastic. Still, the
cap must be sufficiently high that it will allow schools to enter the mar-

ket whose incentives will be to respond to market demand. In 1998-99,
when the Zelman record was established, nobody could have thought
that a private school could operate in the black on $2500 per student
per year.2s8 The Milwaukee voucher program, on the other hand,
capped total school charges at nearly twice that amount, 289 and since
Zelman was decided, the cap has been raised in Cleveland from $2500
to $5000.290 These caps, although they surely require careful attention
to expenses and are well below per-student spending in the traditional
public schools, are plausibly sufficient to allow new entrants to survive
in the education market. 29 1 For this reason, they are consistent with the
"genuine and independent" choice rule, while the lower $2500 cap is
not. Similar arguments can be made regarding the state funding that
follows students to charter schools, which is typically significantly lower
292
than the per-student average funding in traditional public schools,
but, I argue, cannot be too much lower.
See 536 U.S. at 705 (Souter, J., dissenting).
voucher was for $5553 in 2001-02. Wis. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2001-02 2 (Feb. 2002),
http://dpi.wi.gov/sms/doc/mpcO1fnf.doc.
20 See Christina Samuels & Karla Scoon Reid, Ohio OKs Vouchers for Pupils in Low-Rated
Schools, EDUC. WK., July 13, 2005, at 23.
291See David Salisbury, What Does a Voucher Buy?, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Aug. 28, 2003, at 2, 7
("[A] voucher amount of $5,000 or more would give students access to most private
schools.").
292 See Ohio ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d
1148 1 36, 38 (Ohio 2006) (charter schools in Ohio receive per-pupil state funding, but
not per-pupil local funding, that otherwise would have been provided to charter students'
traditional public schools); Vergari, supra note 78, at 24-25 (describing charter school
funding);Julian R. Betts, School Choice as a Remedy for America's Public Schools: Promising Theories Sail into the Empirical Fog 1, 8 (Oct. 2006) (paper presented at October
2006 conference, "Values and Evidence in Educational Reform") (manuscript on file with
author) (arguing that "the financial playing field" is tilted "against charters and in favor of
288

289 Milwaukee's
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At the same time, "genuine and independent choice" does not require that all schools be funded equally or that all parents have equal
purchasing power. So long as the voucher amount permits new entry,
choice programs could constitutionally permit schools to charge additional tuition up to any amount (as Ohio did not), and to use their own
nontuition resources as they like (as Ohio did).2 3 Similarly, notwith-

standing that traditional public schools will be dominant in most educational markets, the state should be permitted to subsidize its own
government-provided public schools at a higher per-student rate than it
subsidizes charters or provides vouchers. 294 States might implement
such preferential subsidies, notwithstanding the manifest unfairness to
the competitors of government-operated schools, to promote diversity,
compensate for private schools' relatively better access to outside funds,
or placate politically influential interest groups. The constitutional requirement is not fairness across institutions, but whether parental
choice is genuine and independent.
Similar to tuition caps are the geographic restrictions that the
Ohio voucher program placed upon which schools would accept
vouchers. Distance from home, as already noted, is an eminently reasonable factor in familial choice among schools. Long distances and
complicated commutes tire students, reduce family time, and divorce
the social world of school from that of neighborhood. It is equally true,
however, that parents will often accept longer commutes in order to
obtain what they view as the more-than-offsetting benefits associated
with a distant school. In Cleveland, two regulations arbitrarily foreregular public schools" because the former face several kinds of costs that the latter do

not); Posting of Shavar Jeffries to blackprof.com, A New Paradigm of Education Reform
Litigation, http://www.blackprofcom/archives/2006/12 (Dec. 30, 2006, 04:44 AM) (blog
post describing class action challenging the funding of charter schools at forty percent of
the level provided traditional public schools).

293 This argument demurs to Gintis's objection that permitting additional charges corrupts the market by making it "likely that political pressures would lead to a lowering of
the size of the public tuition contribution to the point where severe resource inequality
reemerges." Gintis, supra note 215, at 504. (Gintis does not explain why this argument
should not extend to schools' use of resources other than student fees.) My position that
such an "inegalitarian dynamic" in school-funding politics is constitutionally tolerable so
long as public subsidies are sufficient to permit adequate schools to enter the market parallels the shift from equity to adequacy in the finance cases. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
294 Perfect competition would require equal subsidy for all purchasers. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 30, at 93 (describing a system where "[plarents who choose to send their children to private schools would be paid a sum equal to the estimated cost of educating a

child in a public school"); Joseph Viteritti, Reading Zelman, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1105, 1181
(2003) (advocating "financial equity" between public and voucher schools).
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closed these options for parents desiring them: public schools outside
of the Cleveland school district, regardless of space constraints, were
permitted to elect whether to accept vouchers, and private schools outside of Cleveland were foreclosed from doing so. 2 5 Both these choicelimiting policies296 were driven entirely by politics, and neither is justifiable as a matter of pedagogy or choice. 297 The former, in particular,
seems designed purely to ratify the Tieboutian separation of rich children from poor in the face of the challenge to such separation that the
choice idea poses. Without educational or market justification, unnecessary limitations of supply in this way should be held to contravene the
"genuine and independent choice" requirement.
Another example of such a limitation, this one from the charter
school context, would be a low cap on the number of charter schools
that may enter a market. A preeminent example is the limitation in
New York State of the total number of charter schools statewide to
one hundred, which now binds the market. Because the state is creating a market ex nihilo, it may legitimately restrict the number of charters initially issued so as to ensure that the market is not initially
flooded with more new entrants than it can absorb, leading to widespread failures for want of enrollment. But if the goal of such a limitation is to hold the quantity of charter desks supplied well below demand in the medium term, as it appears to be in New York, it should
be viewed as a requirement that impinges upon parents' "genuine
and independent choice." 298 Perhaps unlike the Justices in Zelman, the
test proposed here would reject any such a cap even if it provided
parents in a given area with more than a handful of "choices," be-

'9
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976(A) (3),
3313.976(A) (6) (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
296 I do not list a third demand-side choice limiting policy, i.e., providing choice to
Cleveland residents but not to other poor residents of the metropolitan area. Although a
cap on the number of vouchers available clearly limits the extent of choice, such a cap has
obvious budgetary justification, and in light of the need for a cap the desire to concentrate
voucher-holding parents geographically (as well as in terms of income) is arguably choicemaximizing. For the same reason, Florida's policy in connection with its overturned
voucher program, by which it limited vouchers to students previously enrolled in "failing"
schools, is consistent with "genuine and independent choice." See supranotes 113-115 and
accompanying text.
27 Nor are they justifiable with reference to local sovereignty. Vouchers are state
funded, not locally funded, and the admissions policies of suburban school districts surrounding Cleveland are subject to state control and need not be devolved to local preferences.
28 Government can also restrict the supply of charters to the market more subtly, by
defining the regulatory burden charters face. See Shober et al., supra note 78, at 579-80.
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cause it blocks the market entry mechanism and therefore the ability
of new schools to respond to parent demands.
All regulations affecting schools of course affect the market. Direct
regulation of schools of choice restricts their ability to respond to parental preferences and their willingness to enter or remain in business.
Even regulation confined to traditional public schools affects demand
for alternatives. Still, such regulations are justified by the state's obvious
legitimate interest in regulating both schools and market in order to
promote goals of quality, safety, and civic-mindedness.2 9 The only sen
sible rule is that the state may not regulate schools of choice too much,
an assessment that will inevitably often be ad hoc, and that, in addition,
the state may not regulate in order to bias parental choice in the marketplace.
By identifying "genuine and independent choice" as the kind of
choice enjoyed in an ordinary consumer market, I accept Zelman's
broad insight that choice should be considered genuine even when
options are limited and quality is mixed.30 0 The test proposed here,
however, is less tolerant than was the Zelman majority of anticompeti30 1
tive features of school choice programs.
3. A Pluralist Public Market
Even under a pluralist understanding of the education clauses,
30 2
some choice programs clearly disregard most norms of publicness.
This section argues that the "genuine and independent" criterion of
Zelman, applied in the ways I describe, identifies those choice programs that reflect requirements that schools be "public," "free," and
"uniform."
Although the scope of choice programs is often thought to vary
inversely with their publicness,3 03 the converse seems more accurate. It
is true that robust choice decreases enrollment in traditional "public"
schools, diverts funds that otherwise would have flowed to those
schools, 30 4 and mitigates the direct influence of "public" regulation. But
2" For one example of the inclusion of quality on this list, see DWYER, supra note 45, at

197 (arguing that state regulation of quality is necessary to voucher programs).
00See generally 536 U.S. 639.
301 See generally id. Indeed, the Zelman Court would have been well served to apply this
more demanding understanding of "genuine and independent" in the Establishment context as well. A full argument to this effect is beyond the scope of this Article.
302 See, e.g., Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers 857 N.E.2d 1 32-34.
N3 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 76, at 1392.
304Ohio Cong. of Parents& Teachers, 857 N.E.2d
37.
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these observations, although sound, reflect a statist critique of
choice.30 5 Once the decision is made to permit pluralist choice, the
norms of access, fairness, quality promotion, and a disconnect between
opportunities and ability to pay can and ought to govern the design of
choice programs. "Genuine and independent choice" offers a promising operationalization of those norms that is both institutionalist and
instrumentalist. When options under a choice program are varied and
arise in response to market demand, there is public input into their
design-to be sure, input mediated through a market instead of
through political and bureaucratic institutions, but public nonetheless.
When the number of options is not artificially constrained, more people have access to schools of choice and those schools are in that sense
more public. The same is true when no point of view is a priori preferred in designing school options. And when profound underfunding
of choice schools is barred as anticompetitive, the schools are more
"free." Moreover, because robust choice is Pareto superior to nonrobust
choice with respect to parents, it, in an important sense, contributes to
the requirement that schools be "efficient."
At the same time, "genuine and independent" choice as I define
it does not set the constitutional bar so high that choice programs become unrealistic or unworkable. The test permits states to cap their
expenses at acceptable levels. It allows market choice to be limited. It
preserves both the right to have "free" schools and the right to pay for
schools. And perhaps most important, it creates diverse schools to
serve a diverse population of learners-an approach which, although
the antithesis of uniformity in the institutional-design sense, promotes
equality of educational opportunity in a world where all children are
different.
Programs based upon "genuine and independent" choice also
offer a different compromise than traditional statist schools with respect to states' Pierce obligation to tolerate an educational market and
to localism.30 6 As Part I describes, states have long circumscribed markets for schooling by offering parents only the option either to send
their children, without charge, to a public school in the district in
which they live, or to pay to educate them privately. This is one approach to regulating the educational marketplace; it is most emphatically not a policy that disappears the market or renders it nugatory.
The recognition that markets, even imperfect ones, can enhance the
305 See
306 See

supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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scope of private choice and simultaneously fulfill public values sug-.
gests that this single, grudging, and biased Variety of market regulation-grudging in its limitation of options and biased in its preference for those who can afford private education, those who live in
districts with good schools, and those whose preferences regarding
schooling are similar to their neighbors' 3 07-is not the only policy that
might be characterized as making a school system "free," "public,"
"uniform," or "common."30 8 Statist dimensions of publicness like democratic deliberation and state provision, along with within-school
diversity may suffer under choice; but replacing district-based, stratified, and low-quality educational monopolies with market institutions
is in other ways more responsive to the public will, more free, and
more uniform than the dichotomous pay-or-play choice today imposed upon rich and poor alike.
The "genuine and independent" criterion thus moves the law
away from the selective blindness through which it has long regarded
those aspects of traditional institutional arrangements that are antipublic, antiuniform, and antifree. Here the Florida Supreme Court's
2006 rejection of a voucher benefit for students in failing schools3

09

in

paradigmatic.31 0

Bush v. Holmes is
Indeed, had Florida's public schools
been "uniform" and "high quality," OSP would have been a dead letter: there would have been no failing schools to trigger the scholarships.31 1 Not a word in Holmes recognizes that the situation that the
Florida OSP was designed to ameliorate-some of the state's schools
were good, and others were abysmal-itself violates constitutional
norms.

3 12

Indeed, were Florida's system of public schools to be assessed from
scratch, it is easy to see how a reasonable person-even one with a statist orientation-might conclude that it was neither constitutionally
"free" nor "public." Florida takes the Tieboutian, modal American ap307See MARK GRADSTEIN, MOSHEJUSTMAN & VOLKER MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF EDUCATION 95-102, 104-07 (2005).
S0 Strong statists offer a different resolution to this problem: that private and home
schooling should be abolished and all students required to attend public schools organ-

ized into large, metropolitan districts. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1461, 1472-73 (2003) (arguing as well that
the concomitant abrogation of Pierce rights can survive strict scrutiny because of a compel-

ling interest in equality of educational opportunity).
309See Harris et al., supra note 113, at 220.
310 See generally Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
311 See id. (ten thousand Florida students were eligible for OSP scholarships in 2004-

05).

312See generaUy 919 So. 2d 392.
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proach to school governance. The rich suburbs of Florida run, and levy
taxes to pay for, "public" schools, but the only students entitled to (nroll in these successful schools are the children of residents-mostly the
same affluent suburbanites who pay the bills.3 13 The "public" schools
whose failures would have triggered OSP voucher availability, by contrast, generally enrolled the children of poorer families, demonstrably
more difficult to teach and less likely to succeed; these poorer children
were not invited to attend the "public" schools of the rich. It is reasonable to ask, as we asked about a tuition-free but competitive-enrollment
charter school, whether a traditional public school in a small rich district adjacent to a large poor district, where attendance is conditioned
on the (expensive) home purchase or rental in the small district, is better conceptualized as a public or private school.3 14 The answer, as with
previous answers, depends on the relative weights one assigns to norms
of publicness associated with the values of control, access, and funding.
But, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, it is surely reasonable
to define "public" in a fashion that also permits the satisfaction of the
constitutional command to guarantee "high quality education."3 15 This
Holmes refuses to do. 316 OSP, by contrast, might plausibly have moved
the state in that direction.
The "genuine and independent" criterion for choice would not,
and does not purport to, uproot the localist, Tieboutian foundations
of school governance and finance. Statist views of publicness are legitimate, and traditional arrangements serve important public values
even as they require compromise and carry costs. But this does not
change the fact that in many ways schools called "public" undermine
norms like "free," "public," and "common." These values are served
when states expand the educational marketplace beyond its privateschool and Tieboutian foundations, by insisting that artificial, stateimposed barriers of district lines and local tax authority should give
way absent solid reasons to retain them.
B. Reasonable Connection to Educational Quality
As noted above, the substantive requirements of the education
clauses, as well as their institutional requirements, limit the structure

See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 758.
See Coons, supra note 83, at 597 (suggesting that readers mentally replace the term
private" schooling with "suburban" schooling in evaluating antichoice arguments).
315 FLA. CONST. art IX,§ 1 (a).
316 See generally Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392.
313
314
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of education.3 1 7 If charters or voucher programs prevent the realization of constitutionally required educational adequacy or equity, they
are impermissible even if they are "public."
Notwithstanding the strong theoretical case that choice advances
school quality,3 18 empirical research on choice to date has failed to

demonstrate the realization of its theoretical potential. A recent review
essay notes that evidence for the anticipated benefits of choice is "quite
mixed," and describes the "promising theories" of choice as "sail[ing]
into the empirical fog."3 19 Students attending schools their families
choose under market-like mechanisms have not been reliably demonstrated to learn more than similar students assigned to traditional public schools;

320

nor is there reliable, consistent evidence that public

schools improve when subject to market-like competition. 321 Concerns
that poor families armed with vouchers can easily be misled into
schools worse than the ones they left,322 or that they might make bad

324
choices, 3 23 have also found mixed empirical support.
A failure of choice to yield any of its predicted benefits should, I
think, render it inconsistent with the education clauses. But empirical
research to date documents no such failure. Although the research
strongly suggests that choice does not produce strong, consistent educational benefits across the board, in the current "fog" many ques-

tions remain genuinely open. 325 Some researchers have found benefits

See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
ee supra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
319 Betts, supra note 292, at 1.
320 See generally Dan Goldhaber, School Choice: An Examination of the EmpiricalEvidence on
Achievement, ParentalDecision Making, and Equity, 28 EDUC. RESEARCHER 16 (1999); Patrick
McEwan, The PotentialImpact of Vouchers, 79 PEABODYJ. EDUC. 57 (2004).
321 See generally Eric Bettinger, The Effect of CharterSchools on CharterStudents and Public
Schools, 24 EcoN.. EDUC. REv. 133 (2004).
322 SeeJoseph P. Viteritti, DefiningEquity, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE, supra
317

3 18

note 84, at 13, 18.
323 See Lois ANDRt-BECHELY, COULD IT BE OTHERWISE? 78-79 (2005); Minow, supra
note 198, at 1249-52.
324
325

See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
Accord O'Keefe, supra note 170, at 195, 198. Empirical work can never be perfectly

definitive on this sort of question. The failure to find statistical significance is different
from demonstrating the absence of a relationship. Moreover, the presence of multitudinous confounding factors and relationships often obscures the effect of any one educational practice upon choice, efficiency, equity, and social cohesion. See STEPHEN GONARD,
CHRIS TAYLOR & JOHN FITz, SCHOOLS, MARKETS, AND CHOICE POLICIES 183 (2003) (explaining that "key factors" relevant to some educational outcomes relevant to choice are

"outside the education arena"); William A. Firestone, Education Policy as an Ecology of Games,
18 EDUC. POL'Y RESEARCHER 18, 18 (1989).
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to choice,

26

though generally those findings are not robust;3

odological questions remain open;

28

27

meth-

important variations on choice

3 29
programs, suggested by theory, have been neither tried nor tested;
and, most important, empirical evidence to date remains "very limited."33 0 In the future, empirical knowledge might advance sufficiently
to permit a determination that the requirement that choice be reasonably connected to educational quality is not met.331 In the current
environment, however, what we do not know so overwhelms what we
do know that state officials are well within their prerogatives to rely
upon very strong theoretical arguments favoring choice experiments.
This approach is consistent with what Professor Cass Sunstein has
332
called an "administrative model" of judicial review for positive rights,
which the right to education is manifestly is.333 This is a feature sorely
lacking in the school finance cases, which have been the focus of education-clause jurisprudence to date.3 3 4 The cases signally fail to recognize that education is a positive right, although the school-finance dilemma makes it vivid. Schooling is expensive,3 3 5 and its costs rise with its
326

See Betts, supra note 292, at 27-28.

327 See id. at 34.
328 See Katrina Bulkley &Jennifer Fisler, A Decade of CharterSchools, 17 EDUC. POL'Y 317,
333-34 (2003); Betts, supra note 292, at 17-18, 26-27, 31.
32 See, e.g., JOHN MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 12-18, 21 (2001) (arguing
that the only effective school choice program is one characterized by no price controls,
minimal regulation, and free entry and exit of schools); Dan Goldhaber et al., How School
Choice Affects Students Who Do Not Choose, in GETTING CHOICE RIGHT, supra note 206, at 101,
120-124 (discussing policy design options for assuring a "rich set of alternatives to the
existing public schools").
330 Betts, supra note 292, at 33.
331 Similarly, a robust and entirely convincing empirical demonstration that choice was
the only organizational system that could sustain "thorough and efficient" schools, as
Chubb and Moe purported to find, might require the state to adopt an education organized under market rather than traditional bureaucratic principles. See CHUBB & MOE, supra
note 84, at 190. At the least, the state would have to determine openly that traditional organizations have normative benefits that compensate for the loss of quality they impose. At
this writing, this seems an unlikely problem, as the literature struggles to measure any systematic gains from choice.
332 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 234 (2001)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY]. See generally Cass Sunstein, Social and
Economic Rights-Lessons from South Africa, 12 CONST. FORUM 123 (2001) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social andEconomic Rights].
333 See HALPER, supra note 184, at 163. Surprisingly, it is not always categorized as such.
See, e.g., DINAN, supra note 143, at 237-47.
334 See generally Enrich, supra note 4; Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, supra note 4;
Heise, State Constitutions,supra note 4.
335 In 2001, the nation spent approximately $390 billion on education, "more than de-

fense and not too much less than Social Security."JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

20 (2003).
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ambitions. A legislature that seeks to provide children with sophisticated rather than rudimentary knowledge and skills must undertake
the corresponding expenditure. It must pay even more if it aims to
provide that high-quality education to all children, no matter their cir336
cumstances or challenges.
State courts have reacted to the obvious question-how much
money is enough?-in extreme ways. Some take the view that there is
no ceiling on legislatures' duty to authorize whatever educational
spending is necessary to achieve the substantive results that constitutions require, technological uncertainty be damned. 337 But to require
state legislatures to prioritize education above all else and to ratchet
spending upwards indefinitely is to indulge a jurisprudence of fantasy
rather than seek workable solutions.3 38 Other courts have argued that
finance questions are nonjusticiable matters of pure politics or of legislative spending.3 3 9 This approach effectively reads the education
clauses out of their constitutions.
Professor Helen Hershkoff persuasively argues that positive constitutional rights are a "nondiscretionary feature of the legal order"
that "may not simply be remitted to politics."

3 40

Her argument for ju-

dicial review more demanding than rational basis review, however,
overestimates courts' institutional competence to "develop baselines"
in the educational arena.3 41 Judicial management is unattractive because normative judgments about educational baselines are deeply

336See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 764 (explaining that the cost of equalizing all spending to the level of the highest spending districts "would be astronomical").
37 See Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *13 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May
11, 2004) (holding that state is constitutionally obligated to "provide resources necessary
to close the 'achievement gap'"); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J.
1990) (holding that additional funding is a constitutional requirement notwithstanding
"that no amount of money may be able to ...make the difference" for students in poor
districts); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (explaining that state constitution requires legislature to define "the best" education that can
be achieved and provide funds accordingly).
38 See Alfred A. Lindseth, The Legal Backdrop to Adequacy, in COURTING FAILURE, supra
note 105, at 33, 53, 56 (explaining that cases like Campbell and Montoy require states to
meet "unrealistic [c]" benchmarks).
339See Brooker, supra note 193, at 201-04 (collecting cases).
340 See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of FederalRationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1156 (1999).
341See id. at 1189-90 (reading some finance decisions to develop "a normative baseline
against which to assess educational sufficiency" and use "innovative ...procedural devices"
without exceeding "the limits of [judges'] institutional competence").
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contested, and implementation is inevitably bedeviled by hard techno3 42
logical and measurement questions.
Instead, for many of the same reasons that Sunstein proposes an
"administrative model" of judicial review for substantive rights, 3 43 the

rule here looks at whether choice might reasonably be thought to
help rather than whether it actually helps. 344 For positive rights, it is
more appropriate to demand reasonable legislative decision making,
coherence across related policy approaches, and the "progressive re346
alization of rights"3 45 than actual success of policy on the ground.
This is far from a posture of complete deference to political decision
making, but still recognizes fiscal limitations, a role for administrative
expertise, and a broad (but not infinite) scope of legitimate political
3 47
judgment in a context of technological uncertainty.
Two ways in which this proposal departs from Sunstein's model
are worth noting. First, relative to a right to housing (to take Sunstein's example), the normative content of the right to education is
disputed. In the housing context, the only real normative dispute is
about priorities: whether to give most resources to the desperately
underhoused, or fewer resources per capita to more people at varying
342 See

supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
supra note 332, at 234.
344 Recognizing a similar problem regarding the Establishment Clause, Lupu and Tuttie suggest that "[iun a setting of mixed legal and factual compulsion, and gradual transformation over time, the state's performance-at least initially-should be measured more
by its effort than by its results." Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 235, at 597. Lupu and Tuttle rely
more on evidence of "the state's good faith efforts" than on the reasonableness of their
policy. See id. Similarly, Professor Liu, who understands Congress to have a federal constitutional duty to guarantee a substantive floor of educational adequacy nationwide, asserts
that Congress must undertake "deliberate inquiry... and ... take steps reasonably calculated to ameliorate conditions that deny children adequate opportunity to achieve." Liu,
supra note 2, at 400.
345 This phrase is from S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 26 (articulating a right to housing, and
requiring that "the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right"). Housing, like education, is an expensive, market-based, positive right. The leading case on Section 26 is
South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 11 41-46 (S. Mr.), which itself offered the
occasion for recent important theorizing about the enforcement of substantive rights. See
generally, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 332; Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights, supra note 332;
Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEx. L. Rv. 1895
(2004).
346 Note that the "genuine and independent" criterion can be applied to policies as
implemented as well as policies as articulated. See Grootboom, (1) SA 1 41-46 (stating that
"policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their conception and their implementation").
347 Sunstein calls this last feature Grootboom's "distinctive virtue." Sunstein, Social and
Economic Rights, supra note 332, at 123.
343 SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY,
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levels of housing distress, and whether both of these approaches or
only one should be viewed as constituting "progressive realization" of
the right.3 4 For educational rights, by contrast, normative disputes

are much more pervasive. The rule proposed here therefore gives
state officials more latitude to define quality education for themselves
than the administrative model might provide in other contexts.
Correspondingly, the rule here governs not just "judicial review" 49
but is meant to guide political officials in determining for themselves
what constraints the constitution places upon their behavior. For
courts, the administrative model involves deference; and courts operating under the rule proposed here would very often have to defer to
sensible-sounding proposals generated by the political branches. But, as
Sunstein has argued more generally, political actors bear their own
constitutional duty, "outside the courts," to develop school policies consistent with their state's education clause. 350 These political actors, omniscient with respect to their own motives and analyses, may choose
choice only if they think it will help discharge the duty the constitution
imposes.
CONCLUSION

In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court deemed Ohio's voucher program for Cleveland constitutional because the state used a quasi-market to aggregate parents' genuine and independent choices, in a fashion unbiased by the state's own
preferences. A market, rather than public deliberation, determined
both whether and which religious institutions benefited from state
funds.
The central roles that Zelman accords to the genuineness and independence of parental choice and to the market mechanism express
a view of religious establishment that, however ascendant on the sitting Court, is and will surely long remain deeply contested. Many will
undoubtedly continue to insist that vouchers establish religion even if
distributed under conditions of total government neutrality as to any
possible religious use. And because it is undeniable that government
348

See Rob Rosenthal & Maria Foscarinis, Responses to Homelessness, in A

RIGHT TO

HOUSING, supra note 269, at 316, 326 (stating that strategies to address homelessness must
'first protec[t] existing housing and the tenancy of those already in place").
39 SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMocRAcy, supra note 332, at 234; Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights, supra note 332, at 123.
350 See generally CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrUTION (1993).
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subsidies alter the preferences of at least some people, the Zelm a,
Court's conviction that a "genuine" quasi-market guarantees neut,
ity, government subsidy and regulation notwithstanding, will seen
fanciful to some even as it seems obvious to others.
The use of genuine and independent choice as a standard to determine whether a state has established and supported a system of
"public" or "common" schools, by contrast, should be less controversial. In the context of schools, unlike that of religious establishment,
government neutrality is not an option: one way or another, the state
will subsidize, provide, and regulate schools that have some point of
view, and indeed that embrace a mission of shaping the points of view
of their pupils. The effects of these subsidies, moreover, are necessarily mediated through parental choice and the operation of a market
for schooling. Traditionally, parents make purchasing decisions in
that market by spending (or choosing not to spend) often substantial
sums in order to exercise two constitutional rights: to select a district
in which to live, and to exit the public system and educate their children privately.
There are no good historical, textual, or other reasons to understand the command of state education clauses that schooling be "public" or "common" to permit these, but not other forms, of choice and
markets. Indeed, state systems are considered fully public although
nearly all states greatly inflate the influence of residential choice by
establishing numerous, competing school districts with local monopolies, a policy that vastly exacerbates the advantages that the wealthy
enjoy in the market for schooling. There is every reason also to consider as public systems of vouchers or charters that subsidize individual parental preferences about schools while impartially aggregating
them using a market mechanism. So long as that aggregation is based
upon genuine and independent parental choices, unbiased insofar as
possible by state regulation, such a pluralist, market-based approach is
no less "public"-and indeed is more fair, open, and participatorythan traditional arrangements. Such systems might also help to realize
the substantive guarantees of the education clauses, too often neglected by traditional forms, that all children be schooled not only
publicly, but well.

